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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION OR CONTRACT
THEORY RESTRICTIONS?-THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING JUDI
CIAL REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOUNDED ON UN
DERLYING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES

INTRODUCTION

The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guide
lines") are a set of sentencing rules which were enacted to require
all federal judges to sentence defendants found guilty of like crimes
to similar sentences.! The Guidelines were enacted to combat prej
udicial and disparate sentencing for like defendants and require
judges to incarcerate convicted defendants for a congressionally
predetermined range of months based on a variety of factors.2 The
court may only reduce the predetermined sentence if the prosecu
tor files a "substantial assistance" motion requesting a downward
departure. 3 A downward departure is a deviation from the
1. See infra Part I.B for a further discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines.
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5KU (1998); see also Lisa M.
Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two
Districts, 30 CONN. L. REv. 569, 569 (1998) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines fill a
need to "humanize" the criminal sentencing procedure and reduce "gross evils" and
variable sentences that were present prior to the implementation of the Guidelines)
(quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrnoUT ORDER vii, x
(1973)).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5KU (1998). A 5K1.1 motion,
commonly referred to as a substantial assistance motion, is a motion from the prosecu
tor notifying the court that the defendant has provided information that assisted the
prosecutor in apprehending and prosecuting other criminals. See id. This may include
accomplices, suppliers, or other criminals with whom the defendant has interacted. See
id. If the prosecutor finds the assistance to be adequate and useful, the prosecutor can
request that the defendant be given a reduced sentence that is below the statutory mini
mum (otherwise known as a "downward departure"). See id. The prosecutor accom
plishes this by filing a substantial assistance motion requesting a downward departure
on behalf of the defendant. See id. Section 5K1.1 provides as follows:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided sub
stantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons
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mandatory statutory minimum and ultimately results in a reduction
in the defendant's overall sentence. 4 The court cannot file this mo
tion independently if the prosecutor decides not to do SO.5 Thus,
only the prosecutor has the power to file a downward departure
motion; however, it is entirely within the court's discretion to grant
or deny the motion. 6 The prosecutor will only consider filing a
downward departure motion if he or she is satisfied that the defend
ant has provided the prosecutor with substantial assistance. The
"substantial assistance" given by the defendant must assist the pros
ecutor in prosecuting or investigating another who has committed a
criminal offense. 7 If the prosecutor deems the defendant's assiststated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the
following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defend
ant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation
of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id. at 356.
4. See id. A substantial assistance motion is one of only two ways a defendant
can deviate from the Guideline sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 5K1.1 and 5K2.0 (1998). Section 5K2.0 permits deviation from the Guidelines if an
"aggravating circumstance" is present and the facts of the case involve factors not ade
quately taken into consideration by the drafters of the Guidelines. Id. § 5K2.0, at 357
58. Judges rarely use an aggravating circumstance as a reason for deviation since Con
gress created the Guidelines to be very broad and all encompassing. See Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105, 107-09 (1994) (stating that the purpose of the
Guidelines was to increase prosecutorial discretion over sentencing and limit unchecked
judicial discretion). This leaves little opportunity for judges to encounter a situation
that is unique to the Guidelines. See id.
5. See United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating
that a district court is not permitted to depart downward under § 5K1.1 without a gov
ernment motion), affd by an equally divided court, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990). The
court also rejected the argument that that the government motion requirement was a
nonbinding statement of public policy. See id.; see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S.
181 (1992); United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1555 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (stating that
"[u]pon motion of the government . ..") (emphasis added); see also Isaac, 141 F.3d at
481 (stating that the decision to grant the motion is completely within the court's discre
tion); see also United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that
whether substantial assistance was given is a determination exclusively within the dis
cretion of the prosecutor, and not the court).
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for the factors relevant for a substan
tial assistance motion.
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ance truly beneficial and useful in a subsequent investigation or
prosecution of another, the prosecutor may, but is not compelled
to, file a substantial assistance motion with the court.8 Once the
prosecutor files the motion, the court may then· examine several
factors, such as the significance, usefulness, truthfulness, complete
ness, and reliability of the information, to ultimately determine
whether to allow the prosecutor's motion and reduce the sentence
below the predetermined range. 9 If a judge decides to allow the
motion, the judge must determine the extent of the sentence depar
ture. 1O While evidence of the defendant's assistance may tempt the
sentencing court to depart from the Guidelines absent the prosecu
tors filing of a substantial assistance motion, the Guidelines prohibit
the court from doing SO.l1 Thus, the defendant's only chance at ob
taining a prison sentence below the statutory minimum is by (a)
acting in a manner which prompts the prosecutor to file a substan
tial assistance motion, and (b) having the motion filed before a
judge who allows the prosecutor's motion and ultimately orders a
reduced sentence. 12
Defendants enter guilty pleas in nearly ninety percent of cases
in which the Guidelines are applicable, and most involve some form
of agreement with the prosecutor.B In many plea agreements, to
8. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (implying that the
decision to file a substantial assistance motion rests with the prosecutor because § 5K1.1
states "upon motion of the government") (emphasis added).
9. See id. Many critics of the Guidelines argue that these vague factors provide
far too little guidance to the prosecutor and the defendant. See Lee, supra note 4, at
125 (stating that the lack of uniform prosecutorial policies results in vastly differing
factorial applications).
10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998). The motion im
poses no mandatory obligation on the court, but rather increases the sentencing options
available to the court. See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "[u]nder the Guidelines, sentencing judges retain discretion to accept or
reject [the substantial assistance motion] and ... depart from the Guidelines").
11. See United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Isaac,
141 F.3d at 481 (stating that "[t]he language of § 5KU requires that the government
make a motion before a district court can depart from the sentencing guidelines range
in recognition of a defendant's substantial assistance").
12. See Lee, supra note 4, at 108 (stating that a judge may not order a reduced
sentence unless the prosecutor files a substantial assistance motion). The effect of the
government motion requirement is to give the prosecutor the authority to block a
downward departure for substantial assistance. See id. at 112. If the prosecutor refuses
to file the motion, the court cannot, on its own, impose a lower sentence. See id.; see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998).
13. See Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assist
ance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good Faith Standard, 78 MINN.
L. REV 1253, 1264 (1994).
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ensure full compliance and cooperation from the defendant, the
government reserves the "sole discretion"14 to determine whether
or not the defendant has in fact provided substantial assistance. 15
This reservation of discretion by the prosecutor is an attempt to
give the defendant the opportunity to obtain a lessened prison sen
tence in exchange for information regarding other criminal activity.
A prosecutor may also include a sole discretion clause in a plea
agreement in order to avoid judicial intervention in the prosecutor's
decision to file or not file the substantial assistance motion. 16 For
example, a sole discretion clause may be written as follows: "If the
Government in its sole discretion determines that the defendant has
fulfilled his obligations of cooperation as set forth [in the rest of the
plea agreement], at the time of sentencing or within one (1) year
thereof the government will ... [mJake a motion to allow the Court
to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines . . . ."17
Because the defendant has a significant interest in having the
prosecutor file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant is en
couraged to assist the prosecutor to his or her fullest ability. Again,
14. The Restatement of Contracts makes it clear that if the agreement leaves no
doubt that it is only honest satisfaction that is meant and no more, it will be so inter
preted, and the condition does not occur if the obligor is honestly, even though unrea
sonably, dissatisfied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1979). "In
such cases the promisor is the sole judge of the quality of work, and his right to reject, if
in good faith, is absolute and may not be reviewed by court or jury." JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 503 (3d ed. 1987). Where
the agreement imposes a personal satisfaction requirement, the issue is whether the
promisor acted in good faith, and the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the
bad faith. See id. at 504 n.54.
15. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993). In Forney, the plea
agreement stated that "the defendant understands that the determination as to whether
he has provided 'substantial assistance' rests solely with the government. ..." Id. at
1495. Similarly, in United States v. Thompson, No. 97-3172, 1998 WL 544313, at *1
(10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1998) (unpublished opinion), the plea agreement stated "if, in the
sole opinion of the United States Attorney's office, the defendant's cooperation
amounts to substantial [assistance], the government will file a motion, pursuant to sec
tion 5Kl.1 ...." Id. In United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997), the plea
agreement stated that "the discretion and decision to file any motion ... pursuant to
§ 5K1.1 (downward departure for substantial assistance) rests solely with the govern
ment." Id. at 938.
16. See John S. Austin, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance:
The Power and Authority ofJudicial Review - United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 263 (1993). The prosecutor is "uniquely competent" to decide whether to file a
substantial assistance motion, and therefore that decision is "not well suited to judicial
review." See id. at 284 (citing United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1992)).
The memorialization of sole discretion serves this principle. See id. at 284-85 (discuss
ing the problems that would exist if the prosecutor did not have sole discretion).
17. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1998).
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absent a motion for sentence reduction, a defendant has no chance
at getting a sentence less than the harsh statutory minimum. Fre
quently, however, the defendant does everything within his or her
power to substantially assist the prosecutor, and yet the prosecutor
still chooses not to file a sentence reduction motion. ls Thus, the
defendant has no chance of obtaining a sentence below the statu
tory minimum and is forced to endure the full extent of punish
ment, regardless of the extent of his or her prosecutorial assistance.
When the prosecutor refuses to file a substantial assistance mo
tion, a defendant will usually attempt to challenge the decision by
filing an interlocutory appeal.1 9 On appeal, defendants argue that
they have substantially assisted the government by providing infor
mation regarding criminal activity, yet have obtained no benefit in
return. 20 The reviewing court must, however, first decide whether it
has the power to review the prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial
assistance motion. 21 Where the plea agreement explicitly vests the
prosecutor with "sole discretion" to determine what constitutes
"substantial assistance," the federal circuit courts have split on the
issue of whether they have jurisdiction to perform this review. The
majority of the circuits (hereinafter "the non-reviewing circuits")22
have held that plea agreements are not contracts, and that a prose
cutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion is com
pletely within the prosecutor's discretion, and therefore
unreviewab1e. 23 A minority of circuits (hereinafter "the reviewing
18. See id. at 480 (stating that while the defendant had met with the prosecutors
and attempted to reveal all information in his possession, the government still chose not
to file a § 5K1.1 motion); see also United States v. Certuche, No. 97-1327, 1998 WL
537778, at *1 (2d Cir. July 29,1998) (unpublished opinion). In Certuche, the defendant
and his son attempted to reveal all known information, yet the prosecutor remained
unsatisfied. See id.
19. See BLACK'S LAW DlcrJONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990), defining interlocutory ap
peal as: "An appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which
is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits."
20. See United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"Burrell contends that his role in [the defendant's] guilty plea constituted substantial
assistance to the government, and that he was entitled to a downward departure
notwithstanding the government's failure to move for one. He buttresses his claim by
recounting the harassment to which he and his family were subjected [to] as a result of
the public perception, based upon the plea, that he was a 'snitch''').
21. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 477, 484 (finding that a district court has jurisdiction to
determine whether the government's refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion ... is attributable
to bad faith and, accordingly, in violation of the plea agreement").
22. See infra Part II.A for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do not review
a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
23. See United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating
that absent language obligating the government to file a substantial assistance motion,
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circuits")24 have held that sole discretion plea agreements are con
tracts.25 These circuits have held that a court may review the prose
cutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion using
contract principles such as good faith, duress, illusory promise, and
unconscionability.26 Specifically, the reviewing circuits have held
that even though the prosecution reserves the "sole discretion" to
decide whether the defendant has provided substantial assistance,
the court has the power to ensure that the prosecution acted in
good faith when making that determination. 27
Part I of this Note examines plea bargaining in general,28 in
cluding the interplay between plea bargaining and the United
States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 29 Part I also explores the
role of the prosecutor in the judicial system and the discretionary
power he or she possesses. 30 This Part includes a discussion of an
important Supreme Court decision that provides a basis for how
courts should deal with prosecutorial discretion in generaPl
Lastly, Part I examines two important Supreme Court cases that
provide the framework around which the issue regarding review
ability of a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance
motion may be resolved. 32 Part II of this Note examines the circuit
reviewability of prosecutorial discretion is only possible if the prosecutor's motivation
was unconstitutional or "not rationally related to a legitimate government end"); see
also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (stating that a prosecutor has
the power, not a duty to file a 5K1.1 motion, and the prosecutor's decision can be chal
lenged if it "was based on an unconstitutional motive").
24. See infra Part ILB for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do review a
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
25. See infra Part II.B for a thorough discussion of contract applicability to plea
agreements. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481-83.
26. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the benefits and detriments of applying
contract principles in this context. See generally Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481 (finding that plea
agreements are "contractual in nature and [must] be analyzed under contract-law prin
ciples") (quoting United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989».
27. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 484 (stating that the court should call upon the prosecu
tor to prove it acted in good faith when deciding not to file the substantial assistance
motion); see also United States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(stating that "[a] court'may review a prosecutor's refusal to recommend a downward
departure for substantial assistance to determine if the prosecutor acted in bad faith").
28. See infra Part LA for a discussion of plea bargaining principles.
29. See infra Part LB.1 for a discussion of the interplay between plea bargaining
and the Sentencing Guidelines.
30. See infra Part LB.3 for a discussion of the role a prosecutor plays within the
judicial system.
31. See infra Part LB.3 for a discussion of the interplay between Supreme Court
jurisprudence and prosecutorial discretion in general.
32. See infra Part LB.4 for a discussion of the reviewability of prosecutorial dis
cretion and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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split that has emerged as the courts of appeals have struggled with
this issue. 33 Part III examines the implications of applying contract
principles to plea agreements, and suggests that sole discretion plea
agreements are not distinguishable from contracts. 34 Finally, Part
III proposes an alternative method of resolving the issue of review
ing a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance mo
tion by modifying the plea agreement to allow defendants to retain
certain constitutional rights if they are dissatisfied with the prosecu
tor's decision. 35
I.

THE USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PLEA BARGAINING AND
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE MOTIONS

A.

Plea Bargaining and Its Place in the Judicial System

The plea bargain is a tool with longstanding judicial rootS.36
Many of the purposes for plea bargaining still exist today, even
though prosecutors use plea bargaining differently than when the
judiciary first implemented it.
1.

Common Law Usage and Application

The common law recognized the practice of "approvement,"
under which an individual accused of a felony could receive a par
don. 37 This practice, which originated in England,38 required an in
dividual to reveal his or her accomplice and assist with the
33. See infra Parts II.A and II.B for a detailed discussion of the existing United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals split.
34. See infra Parts lILA and III.B for a discussion of contract applicability and
the potential consequences of this application.
35. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the consequences of a proposed con
gressional statutory modification.
36. See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargain
ing?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 757-60 (1998)
(discussing the longstanding practice of plea bargaining throughout American history);
see also Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 1,8 (1992) (stating that the "[m]odero [plea bargaining] practice thus has ancient
roots").
37. See Hughes, supra note 36, for a discussion of plea bargaining at common law.
38. See Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in
the Name of a Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 749, 775 n.25 (1999) ("The doctrine of
approvement, which 'offered formal pardons to certain classes of fugitive offenders on
condition that they surrender, confess themselves guilty, and procure the capture and
conviction of their colleagues,' had been codified in England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.") (quoting John L. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1,94 (1983».
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conviction of that accomplice. 39 Apart from approvement, which
had become unpopular by the eighteenth century, there also existed
an informal practice by which an accused, though not legally enti
tled to do so, could obtain a pardon by confessing to the act and
revealing his or her accomplice(s).4o If satisfied with the defend
ant's assistance, the monarch, or his or her direct servants, would
grant the plea to the defendant.41 Although this practice of pardon
ing was often applied in a prejudicial manner,42 both of these early
English practices served an important function in the judicial sys
tem prior to the industrial revolution. Namely, because of the lack
of forensic technology and organized police forces, these methods
were the only means by which the government could procure infor
mation and effectively apprehend multiple criminals. 43
2.

Modern Usage and Application

Although the modern plea agreement varies greatly from its
ancient predecessor, the underlying "bargain" principle remains the
same. 44 Today, only the prosecutor has the power to enter into a
plea agreement with a defendant, as opposed to earlier times when
39. See id. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990), which defines ap
provement as:
[A] practice of criminal prosecution[] by which a person accused of treason or
felony was permitted to exonerate himself by accusing others and escaping
prosecution himself. The custom existed only in capital cases, and consisted in
the accused, called "approver," being arraigned and permitted to confess ...
or accuse another as his accomplice of the same crime in order to obtain his
pardon.
According to the definition of approver, if the approver "failed to convict those he
accused" of being his accomplices, he was immediately hung. See id.
40. Lord Mansfield described this informal practice as follows:
Where the accomplice has made a full and fair confession of the whole truth
and is admitted as a witness for the crown, the practice is, if he act[s] fairly and
openly and discover[s] the whole truth, though he is not entitled of right to a
pardon ... the practice of the court is to stop tl1e prosecution against the
accomplice, the understanding being that he has an equitable title to a recom
mendation for the king's mercy.
The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 600 (1879) (paraphrasing Lord Mansfield in Rex v.
Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114,1116 (1775».
41. See generally id.
42. Cf Hughes, supra note 36, at 7-8 for a related discussion of plea bargaining in
Great Britain.
43. See id. It was "essential to procure [an] accomplice['s] testimony in order to
track down or build a case against a major criminal." Id. at 7. It was customary to
prominently offer pardons to accomplices who would come forward to testify and con
vict co-conspirators. See id. It was also common to offer cash payments to witnesses
who came forward and testified about the illegal act. See id. at 7-8.
44. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
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it was the monarch who acted as prosecutor and judge. 45 In mod
ern times, the accused gives up fundamental rights in exchange for a
lessened sentence, or at least the possibility of a lessened sen
tence. 46 In return, the prosecutor secures a conviction and gains
valuable information about other criminal activity.47 In The Whis
key Cases,48 the United States Supreme Court approved of plea
bargaining, so long as the prosecutor did not force the defendant to
incriminate himself. 49 While the Supreme Court has approved of
plea bargaining in general, it has not specifically created a standard
or test to determine how much information the defendant must di
vulge in order to obtain a reduced sentence or "downward depar
ture."50 Presently, the determination of the adequacy of
information is made entirely by the prosecutor. 51
YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992). "Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains; [and]
it seems natural to argue that they should be regulated and evaluated accordingly." Id.
45. See Guidorizzi, supra note 36 for a general discussion of the origins and his
tory of plea bargaining. See People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Mich. 1988) (stat
ing that "the police possess neither the authority to withhold prosecution nor to grant
immunity, [and] no formal system exists by which to check the potentially unbridled
discretion the police would possess if allowed to make binding promises precluding
prosecution"; only the prosecutor has such power).
46. The accused, in exchange for a plea, may give up such valuable constitutional
rights as the right to stand trial, face one's accuser, proclaim one's innocence, and de
fend oneself. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998).
47. See Jean Choi DeSombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S.
Criminal Justice System: An Examination of Pretrial Rights of the Criminally Accused in
Japan and the United States, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 120 (1995). The author
states:
In ideal plea bargaining, the defendant and the state are on a level playing
field and both parties benefit by an arrangement reached through a plea bar
gain: the defendant, in exchange for providing the prosecutor with valuable
information, Le., a confession to the crime, receives a sentence or charge re
duction and the state in return for its leniency disposes of the case quickly and
thereby saves resources.
Id.
48. 99 U.S. 594 (1879).
49. See id. at 596.
50. See generally id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5Kl.1 (1998).
51. See United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the ab
sence of arbitrariness or unconstitutional motivation ... we must abide by the prosecu
tor's decision."); see also Austin, supra note 16, at 284-85 for a discussion of the
limitations placed on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor plays
an integral part in the judicial system, and therefore is allowed vast discretion. See id.
at 279-80. The prosecutor has the discretion to prosecute, decide what charges to press,
obtain a search warrant, choose the witnesses to be presented to the grand jury, decide
whether to seek joint trial of persons or offenses, and whether to enter into a plea
bargain with the defendant. See id. at 280.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

158

3.

[Vol. 22:149

Benefits of Plea Agreements

A defendant convicted of a federal crime faces fairly strict con
gressionally predetermined sentences that judges are restricted
from modifying. 52 The United States Constitution confers upon
every criminal defendant basic constitutional rights. 53 These rights
include the right to face his or her accuser, the right to remain si
lent, the right not to self-incriminate, the right to be heard, the right
to a jury of his or her peers, and the right to plead not guilty, just to
name a few. 54 Furthermore, the defendant has the right to force the
prosecutor to move forward with trial and prove his or her case
against the defendant. 55 In addition, although charged with a crimi
nal act, the defendant still retains his or her freedom to contract. 56
Thus, the defendant may attempt to enter into a binding plea agree
ment with the prosecutor to avoid these strict penalties. 57
Moreover, "[t]he prosecutor has the right to seek the maxi
mum sentence for the maximum offense that can be proven at
trial," within ethical boundaries. 58 Consequently, a defendant has
an incentive to bargain with the prosecutor. "If the freedom to ex
change entitlements59 were denied altogether in the allocation of
52. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides the following:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence[sic].
Id.

54. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 362 (1993); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 112 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
55. See United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a
plea bargain deters a defendant from exercising his constitutional right to proceed with
trial and forces the prosecutor to prove his case) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 362-64 (1978».
56. See United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that a
defendant's right to contract is constitutional).
57. See generally Anjili Soni & Michael E. McCann, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Proceedings: Guilty Pleas, 84 GEO. L.J. 1039
(1996)("There is no constitutional right to plea bargain. However, prosecutors must
comply with equal protection requirements when ... plea bargaining. Rule 11(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the conduct of the government and the
defendant during plea negotiations ... and authorizes plea agreements ....").
58. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1914.
59. Entitlement is defined as the "[r]ight to benefits, income or property which
may not be abridged without due process." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed.
1990).
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criminal punishment, defendants would not have the option of
pleading guilty in exchange for foregoing the burden and expense
of a full trial. That is, not only plea bargains, but unbargained-for
guilty pleas would be forbidden."60 Therefore, a defendant retains
the right to bargain, make offers, and accept offers, even though
other rights may be restricted or taken away upon arrest. 61 The
prosecutor acquires certain rights when he or she enters into plea
negotiations with the defendant. 62
Plea agreements have societal importance beyond the interests
of the individual parties.63 For example, a plea agreement provides
a method by which a prosecutor can dramatically increase the rate
of successful prosecutions because whenever the defendant pleads
guilty, the prosecutor avoids a possible "not guilty" jury verdict. 64
Furthermore, the prosecutor can avoid expending significant en
ergy, time, and costs by avoiding trial. In tum, the plea agreement
dramatically reduces the overburdened federal dockets. 65 When a
prosecutor adds a substantial assistance element to the traditional
plea agreement, the prosecution may also obtain valuable informa
tion about other criminal activity.66 Criminal defendants also bene
fit from the use of plea agreements because pleading guilty to a
lesser offense allows defendants to avoid the maximum penalty for
their accused crime and the stigma often related to that penalty.67
60. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1913.
61. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that although
the defendant retains many rights after arrest, a person loses some rights to personal
privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also Yale H. Yee, Note,
Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual
Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461, 476 (1995) (discussing Jones v. Murray and the con
stitutionality of collecting blood samples from convicted felons in order to create a
DNA database).
62. The prosecutor has the right to accept or deny the final draft of the plea
.
agreement. See Austin, supra note 16, at 280-81.
63. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1121, 1129 (1998) ("A settlement is societally efficient, compared to the alternative of
requiring each party to keep what they have; namely, their chance of winning at trial,
with all attendant risks and benefits.").
64. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915 ("Plea bargaining provides a
means by which prosecutors can obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions,
holding resources constant.").
65. See id.; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (noting that plea agreements have become a necessity in today's adminis
tration of justice). See infra Part 1.A.4 for further discussion of the societal importance
of plea bargaining.
66. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915.
67. See id. By utilizing the plea bargain system, "[c]riminal defendants, as a
group, are able to reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions." Id.
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Likewise, the defendant gains the possibility of a sentence reduc
tion below the congressionally proscribed minimum sentence if he
substantially assists the prosecutor. 68
Thus, a plea agreement generally involves two parties who may
each benefit from the cooperation of the other. 69 Either party can
propose a possible plea agreement, but only the prosecutor has the
power of acceptance,1o Therefore the ultimate decision to enter
into a plea agreement rests with the prosecutor. 71 Because this
gives the prosecutor the overall bargaining advantage, the prosecu
tor begins negotiations with the upper hand.72 Once the prosecutor
decides that a plea agreement could benefit the government, the
prosecutor will usually make the initial offer to the defendant. 73
After the initial offer is made, negotiating the major terms of the
plea agreement can be difficult for the defendant because of the
defendant's constant inferior bargaining position. 74 Ultimately the
parties may reach a mutual agreement based on offer and accept
ance. 75 Some courts classify this transaction as contractual in na
ture, irrespective of its criminal context, and allow contract
enforceability doctrines to apply,16 These courts have reasoned
68.

See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998).
See Eric S. Baker, Note, Double Jeopardy and Its Application to Broken Plea
Agreements, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 127,137 (1989). "Plea agreements offer benefits to both
the state and the defendant. Courts recognize the advantages of plea bargaining in
easing court dockets and aiding in a more effective judicial system." Id. Thus, it is
crucial to require that plea agreements be honored in order to ensure that both parties
will continue to derive a benefit. See id.
70. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargain in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 1471, 1478 (1993) (stating that "[o]ne important feature of prosecutors' monop
sony power is the ability, in the presence of the judge, to dictate the [final] price, that is,
the terms, of plea agreements"); see generally Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea
Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 987 (1995).
71. See Acevedo, supra note 70, at 994 (stating that the prosecution has absolute
control over the entire plea bargaining process).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90
HARV. L. REv. 564, 579 (1977) (stating that "the right to reject the proposed plea bar
gain is largely chimerical. Fear of heavier sentence after trial and deference to advice of
defense counsel might lead defendants to accept virtually all plea agreements"); see also
United States v. Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the "Govern
ment ... enjoys significant advantages in bargaining power").
75. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (6th ed. 1990), which defines offer and
acceptance in a bilateral contract as "the two elements which constitute mutual assent, a
requirement of the contract."
76. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that ex
change of consideration between parties constitutes a binding enforceable agreement);
69.
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that because plea bargains are contractual in nature, it is appropri
ate to analyze the agreements using contract principles. 77
4. The Modern Judicial System's Dependence Upon Plea
Bargaining
Today, the disposition of criminal charges by an agreement be
tween the prosecutor and the defendant is an essential element of
the administration of justice.78 Plea bargaining agreements are
highly desirable because they offer prompt final dispositions of
most criminal cases.79 Plea bargaining enhances whatever chances
the guilty have of receiving a lesser sentence. so Most criminal pros
ecutions are settled without a trial because both sides feel the bene
fits of plea bargains outweigh going to trial. 81 Even if a defendant is
clearly guilty, and the prosecution has overwhelming evidence, the
plea saves the resources of the legal system and allows the prosecu
tor to secure a conviction without expending the time and energy
required for trial. 82 In plea bargaining, the "rule of law is invariably
sacrificed to the rule of convenience. "83 Plea bargaining has, in
see also United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[c]ooperation agreements, like plea bargains, may usefully be interpreted with princi
ples borrowed from the law of contract"); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713
(2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "[c]ooperation agreements, like plea bargains, are inter
preted according to principles of contract law").
77. See supra note 76; see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1968 ("The time
has come to put rights talk to one side and view plea bargaining through the lens of
contract."); Julie Lumpkin, Note, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a
Defendant Has Materially Breached a Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1059, 1067
(1987) (stating that "[c]ourts that have addressed plea bargain disputes have used to
some extent a contract law framework and terminology to analyze and describe plea
agreements").
78. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (stating that "[i]f every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the State and the Federal Govern
ment would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities").
79. See generally, Holly L. Nickerson, Note, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 741, 746
(1998) (" 'The criminal justice system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious crime
through plea bargaining."') (citation omitted). "Further, '[g]iven the prevalence of its
use, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court of the United States has labeled plea
bargaining "as an essential component of the administration of justice."'" Id. (citation
omitted).
80. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (listing 5Kl.1 as
one of the very few ways to deviate from the rigid Guideline sentencing grid).
81. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1915 (observing that prosecutors benefit
by obtaining larger net returns from criminal convictions and conserving resources,
while defendants reduce the risk of having to serve maximum sentences).
82. See Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 50, 53-56 (1968).
83. Id. at 85.
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fact, become a necessity because of the overwhelming number of
defendants and lack of processing resources. 84
Prior to 1987, if a court sentenced a defendant to prison, it was
virtually impossible to predict the sentence he would receive be
cause of the judge's use of subjective criteria in formulating
sentences. 85 Pre-Guideline judges were free to utilize any factors
they deemed relevant to sentence a defendant, such as the of
fender's personality, social background, motivation for criminal
conduct, and the potential for effective correctional treatment. 86
Such broad discretion led to non-uniform sentencing throughout
the federal court system. In an effort to curb inconsistent
sentences, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines. 87
B.

The Sentencing Guidelines

Prior to an objective system of sentencing guilty defendants,
the courts could use virtually any factor about the defendant to in
fluence their sentencing decisions. 88 "This resulted in a wide range
84. See id. at 54-55.
85. See Karen Bjorkman, Note, Who's the Judge? The Eighth Circuit's Struggle
with Sentencing Guidelines and the Section 5KI.I Departure, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
731, 734-35 (1992).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 736 (stating that the Guidelines were conceived to further the crea
tion of an honest and uniform sentencing procedure). Between the mid-1920's and the
mid-1970's there was less need for plea bargains because the incarceration rate was
remarkably low, averaging approximately 110 prisoners per 100,000 United States citi
zens. See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of u.s. Prison Populations Revis
ited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743, 743 (1993); see also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 413-14
(Cal. 1970) (stating that the judicial system depends on the existence and usage of plea
bargaining to function). Over the past two decades the prison population rate has in
creased dramatically. In 1991, federal and state correctional facilities housed 823,414
inmates, an increase of 150% in eleven years, or 310 sentenced prisoners per 100,000
United States citizens. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1991 (1992). Overall, these
numbers far exceed incarceration capacity in state and federal facilities. See id. at 7.
Therefore, it is in the judicial system's best interest to reduce the number of prisoners
and the duration of their incarceration. But see generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideolo
gies,72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983)(arguing that plea bargains undercut the moral aspects of
crirninallaw because private party compromises destroy any notion of an objective soci
etal determination of moral guilt, regardless of the fact that the American judicial sys
tem is based on this notion).
88. See S. REp No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3221; see also Ryan M. Zenga, Note, Retroactive Law or Punishment for a New Of
fense- The Ex Post Facto Implications of Amending the Statutory Provisions Governing
Violations of Supervised Release, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 499, 502-03 (1997) (stating
that "[b]ecause sentencing laws [prior to the enactment of the Guidelines] provided
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of sentences for defendants who had committed very similar crimes,
and [this disparity] was identified by Congress as a primary justifi
cation for changing the· system."89 To overcome judicial biases
against defendants and to permit sentencing based wholly on objec
tive criteria, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines. 90
1.

How the Guidelines Work to Promote Consistency

Before the implementation of the Guidelines in 1984, plea
agreements allowed defendants to avoid the virtual free reign fed
eral district courts possessed regarding sentencing. 91 "For almost a
century, the Federal Government employed ... a system of indeter
minate sentencing" in which statutes specified penalties for only a
small number of crimes.92 Other statutes generally gave the sen
tencing judge wide discretion to decide whether to incarcerate the
offender and for how long, whether to fine him and how much, or
whether to impose some lesser restraint, such as probation.93
This indeterminate sentencing system exemplified Congress'
desire to rehabilitate defendants, rather than punish them. 94 Conlittle guidance, federal sentencing judges were 'left to apply [their] own notions of the
purposes of sentencing' ") (citation omitted).
89. Zenga, supra note 88, at 503 (citing S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 3221).
90. See Antoinette Marie Tease, Downward Departures for Substantial Assistance:
A Proposal for Reducing Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants, 53 MONT. L.
REv. 75, 76-77 (1992). The purpose of the Guidelines is to "'enhance the ability of the
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.'"
Id. (quoting Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, Part A-Introduction, at 1.2).
91. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (finding that a sen
tence imposed by a federal district judge is generally not subject to review and may be
based on independent factors deemed relevant by the judge).
. 92. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). Under this system, "[t]he
actual period of imprisonment [was ultimately] based on the offender's ... progress, as
determined by a parole board." Bjorkman, supra note 85, at 734; see also Zenga, supra
note 88, at 502-03. Parole permits a conditional release from incarceration and allows
the parolee to serve the remainder of his or her sentence outside of an institution. See
Thomas v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 79, 81 (Ariz. 1977). In
contrast, probation is a sentence imposed whereby the criminal is not institutionalized,
but rather placed under the supervision of a probation officer. See State v. Fields, 686
P.2d 1379, 1387 (Haw. 1984).
93. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. According to the Court:
Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to
determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so
selected. This broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later
granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an
elaborate probation system.
Id. at 364.
94. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). In Williams, the United
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gress referred to this system of sentencing as the "rehabilitation
model."95 Under this system, Congress would enact criminal stat
utes; sentencing judges would impose sentences within a defined
permissible statutory range; and the Parole Commission96 would
determine the actual length of the defendant's sentence. 97 There
was no requirement that the judge specifically state any reason for
the chosen sentence in the record. 98 Thus, judges could consider
factors about the defendant that were unrelated to the crime and
impose their own notions of justice.99 This broad discretion eventu
ally resulted in "demonstrably disparate treatment of similarly situ
ated [defendants]."loo Although the Supreme Court had praised
the degree of latitude given to trial judges,lOl the Court has critiStates Supreme Court endorsed the intermediate model of sentencing and stated that
"[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of ... criminal [sentencing]. Refor·
mation and rehabilitation of offenders have become [the] important goals of criminal
jurisprudence." Id.
95. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3221; see also Zenga, supra note 88, at 502.
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990), which defines parole
commission as "[t]he state and federal administrative bodies empowered to decide
whether inmates shall be conditionally released from prison before completion of their
sentences. "
97. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223. The
Parole Commission would then have the ultimate responsibility of setting a release date
upon a determination that the prisoner was rehabilitated.
98. See Fisher, infra note 99, at 745. Because judges were not required to memo
rialize their reasons for sentencing, '''[o]ne judge may sentence in order to rehabilitate,
another to deter the offender ... from committing a similar crime, a third to incapaci
tate, while a fourth may sentence simply to 'punish."" Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablish
ing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1115 (1992) (quoting
PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM viii
(1977». "The pre-Guidelines process encouraged the presentation of [many] legitimate
viewpoints." Id.
99. See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Depar
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1,
3-4 (1991); see also David Fisher, Fifth Amendment-Prosecutorial Discretion Not Ab
solute: Constitutional Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83
J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (1993) (stating that disparate treatment was due
to the "unfettered discretion" granted to the judges in determining sentences, which
allowed them to implement their own individual principles).
100. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 4.
101. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). According to the
Court:
A sentencing judge is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant-if
not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics.
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cized the system for allowing disparate treatment of similarly situ
ated individuals. 102
In addition to the mounting criticism of disparate sentencing
outcomes, theoretical questions about the effectiveness of the reha
bilitation model caused many courts to strongly challenge the inde
terminate sentencing system. 103 After all, the purpose of the system
was to allow sentencing judges to work with prosecutors and parole
officers to determine the most effective way to rehabilitate the de
fendant.1 04 Although the rehabilitative model allowed judges to in
dividually tailor each sentence to best fit the individual defendant,
rehabilitation soon fell into irreparable disfavor with the public. IDS
As the philosophy behind the rehabilitative model was ques
tioned,l06 courts began examining and applying the retributive
model of sentencing. 107 This philosophical change away from the
intermediate system resulted in the belief that incarceration ought
to serve retributive goals as opposed to rehabilitative goals. lOB
Although judges became less concerned with rehabilitation, it was
eventually found that the retributive sentencing was sporadic and
unpredictable.
Calls for limits on judicial discretion in sentencing prompted
Congress to enact the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act").109
The Act authorized the creation of the United States Sentencing
Id. at 247.
102. The Supreme Court recognized that disparate treatment of similarly situated
individuals led Congress to create sentencing guidelines. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 312 n.35 (1987).
103. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (finding that in
fact, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) rejects rehabilitation, and states that imprisonment "should
serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals").
104. See id. at 363.
105. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing,
45 STAN. L. REv. 523, 555-56 (1993) (stating that "the belief that judges (or anyone
else) can impose sentences to rehabilitate has fallen into disfavor. While many continue
to think that we should try to reform offenders once punishment has been fixed under
an independent rationale, any 'diagnosis' of the prisoner made at sentencing is an un
sound basis for determining the severity of punishment") (citation omitted); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 552
(1978) ("Even if the state could achieve its rehabilitative objectives far more often then
it does, we have become doubtful that an offender's wrongdoing justifies a broad as
sumption of governmental power of his personality. Moreover, almost every means of
rehabilitating criminals has been tried, and almost nothing seems to work.").
106. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366.
107. See id. at 367.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 366-67.
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Commission (the "Commission"), which was responsible for
promulgating a set of objective sentencing guidelines. 110 The Act
was initially included in Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Con
trol Act of 1984. 111 Specifically, the Commission sought to craft
guidelines designed to: (1) provide certainty and fairness; (2) avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
criminal records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct; and (3) maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individual
ized sentences when warranted.1 12
The Guidelines require a judge to proceed through a seven
step process in order to determine a sentence.1 13 This seven-step
110. See u.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUALCh. 1, pt. A, at 1 (1998); see also
G. Adam Schweickert III, Note, Third·Party Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to Sub
stantial Assistance Departure Jurisprudence, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1451 (1998) (stat
ing that the goal of the Act was to '''[e]stablish sentencing policies and practices for the
Federal criminal justice system that ... [would promote overall fairness]"') (quoting
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837,2018).
111. See The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the
Guideline System and Short Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarcer
ation, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 236, 98
Stat. 1837, 2033 (1984).
112. See 28 U.S.C § 991 (1994), which states the following:
(a) There is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch
of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall
consist of seven voting members and one nonvoting member . . . .
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal jus
tice system that
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentenc
ing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggra
vating factors not taken into account in the establishment of gen
eral sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, pe
nal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of
sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States
Code.
Id.; see also Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial
Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REv. 799, 801 (1994)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)(1999»; Schweickert, supra note 110, at 1451.
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (1998) (discussing the
application instructions in general); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERI
ALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 44 (1994). See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentenc
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process includes a calculation that takes into account all factors
deemed relevant by the Commission.n 4 Some factors, like the use
of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, will add to the
sentence, while other factors, such as remorse, will allow a reduc
tion in the sentence.115 The Commission created consistency by
providing a narrow range of sentences from which a judge could
choose when sentencing a defendant with a given set of criminal
characteristics, thereby reducing judicial discretion. 116
One factor that the sentencing judge may take into account
when formulating a sentence is the defendant's "acceptance of re
sponsibility."117 If the defendant admits to the crime and takes full
responsibility for his or her share of the criminal act, the judge may
use that admission in a sentence reduction calculation.1 18 The ac
ceptance of responsibility factor is separate and distinct from "sub
stantial assistance."119 The acceptance of responsibility entitles the
defendant to no more than a two-level reduct jon within the pre
scribed sentencing range,120 whereas substantial assistance can re
sult in a far more significant downward departure and a sentence
far below the statutory minimum, regardless of acceptance of re
sponsibility.121 The categorization of a statement as substantial
ing Guidelines and the Key Comprises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1
(1988) (discussing the workings of the Guidelines).
114. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1 (1998); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 113, at 44; Breyer, supra note 113, at 6-7.
115. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 1Bl.1(c) (1998) (stating that
adjustments in sentencing can be made for factors relating to the victim, the defendant's
role in the crime, and obstruction of justice); see also Fisher, supra note 99, at 746-48.
116. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1 (1998); see
also Fisher, supra note 99, at 746-47. Compare these judicial limitations to pre-guide
line sentencing where the judge was free to determine which, if any, of the defendant's
characteristics would be taken into account. See supra note 99 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the broad discretion given to sentencing judges prior to the enact
ment of the Sentencing Guidelines.
117. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1(e) (1998) (allowing for
an adjustment "as appropriate for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility").
118. See id. § 3El.l. The Comments to section 3El.1 define acceptance of re
sponsibility as "(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of convic
tion, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for
which the defendant is accountable ... ; b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from
criminal conduct or associations; (c) VOluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudica
tion of guilt ...." Id.
119. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 with § 5Kl.l.
120. See U.S. SENTENONG GUIDELINES MANuAL § 3El.1(a) (1998) (stating that
"[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,
decrease the offense level by 2 levels"). See infra note 124 and accompanying text for a
discussion of "levels."
12l. See Daniel J. Sears, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bar
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assistance as opposed to acceptance of responsibility can literally
mean the difference between serving life in prison and serving 15 to
20 months in prison. 122 Thus, a defendant has a significant interest
in obtaining a substantial assistance motion from the prosecutor. 123
More specifically, the Guidelines involve a grid that contains
"forty-three offense levels on its vertical axis and six criminal his
tory categories on its horizontal axis," for a total of 258 sentencing
ranges. 124 There is one sentencing range for "each possible combi
nation of offense level and criminal history category."125 This sys
tem virtually removes all discretion from the judge because the
judge is forced to sentence within a very narrow range of congres
sionally mandated sentences. 126
In Mistretta v. United States,127 the plaintiff challenged the con
stitutionality of the Guidelines on the grounds that they (1)
amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power, and (2) were
a violation of the separation of powers principle. 128 After a lengthy
evaluation of the issues (and a dissent by Justice Scalia), the
Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were constitutional be
cause there was no excessive delegation of legislative power and
therefore no violation of the separation of powers principle. 129
a.

Legislative history

The common law distributed federal sentencing among the
gaining for Freedom, 22 COLO. LAW 485, 485-86 (1993) (stating that it is not possible to
argue that taking responsibility will compensate for a possible lack of a substantial
assistance motion because the sentencing rewards are not comparable).
122. See id. at 487.
123. See id. at 488-89.
124. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 6; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE
LINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table (1998). The grid sentences range from 0-6 months to
life imprisonment. See id.
125. See Selya & Massaro, supra note 112, at 801; see also Selya & Kipp, supra
note 99, at 6.
126. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table (1998); see
also Selya & Massaro, supra note 112, at 801-03; Selya & Kipp, supra note 99, at 6-8.
127. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
128. See id. at 370. The United States Supreme Court has "long insisted that 'the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution'
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
Branch." Id. at 371-72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892». The Constitu
tion provides that "[a]lliegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 1.
129. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384 (stating that the petitioner's fears about erod
ing structural protections appear "to be 'more smoke than fire,' and do not compel us to
invalidate Congress' considered scheme for resolving the seemingly intractable di
lemma of excessive disparity in criminal sentencing").
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three branches of the United States government.13o The Sentencing
Reform Act!3! established the United States Sentencing Commis
sion (the "Commission")!32 as an independent part of the Judicial
Branch of the United States133 "to promulgate guidelines establish
ing sentencing ranges for different categories of federal offenses
and defendants."!34 The Commission attempted to compile a list of
goals based on this congressional objective, yet philosophical
problems arose concerning the Commission members' "differing
perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment."!35 Some
members of the Commission argued that an "appropriate punish
ment should be defined primarily on the basis of the moral princi
ple of 'just desserts.' "136 Other members felt that punishment
should primarily be imposed on the basis of "practical 'crime con
trol' considerations."!37 For now, the Commission has sought to re
solve this philosophical difference by applying an empirical
approach that uses data-estimating factors utilized by the existing
sentencing system as a starting point.138
130. See Kirk D. Houser, Comment, Downward Departures: The Lower Envelope
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 361, 363 & n.20 (1993) (stating
that "Congress defined the maximum sentence, the district judge imposed either proba
tion or a sentence within a statutory range, and a parole official of the Executive
Branch eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment").
131. 28 U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (1984) (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984).
132. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998); see also John
M. Dick, Note, Allowing Sentence Bargains to Fall Outside of the Guidelines Without
Valid Departures: It Is Time for the Commission to Act, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1020
(1997) ("All members are appointed by the President [of the United States] 'by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate,' and they are 'subject to removal ... by the
President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office ...."') (quoting 28 U.S.c.
§ 991(a)(1994 & Supp. II 1996».
133. See Houser, supra note 130, at 363. In creating the Commission, Congress
did not delegate excessive legislative power, but instead, constitutionally called "upon
the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a
matter uniquely within [the expertise] of judges." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412.
134. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 195, (1992).
135. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENT 1.3 (1987).
136. Id. (stating that under this principle, "punishment should be scaled to the
offender's culpability" and the harms resulting from the criminal act. "Thus, if the de
fendant is less culpable, the defendant deserves less punishment").
137. Id. (stating that "[d]efendants sentenced under this scheme should receive
the punishment that most effectively lessens the likelihood of future crime, either by
deterring others or incapacitating the defendant").
138. See id. at 1.4. Using the empirical system, the Commission has analyzed data
drawn from 10,000 pre-sentence investigations in order to determine which distinctions
are important in sentencing. See id. This approach has allowed the Commission to
create a condensed list of relevant distinctions that comprise the separate Guideline
factors. See id. The empirical system is considered a compromise between the "just
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The Act attempted to incorporate all of the Commission's
goals139 into an objective empirical system.1 40 After a period of in
tensive review the Commission issued initial guidelines that took
effect on November 1, 1987. 141 The Act further mandated that the
Commission study the impact and implementation of the Guide
lines.1 42 Congress intended for the impact evaluation to focus on
data for the four-year period immediately following the implemen
tation of the first draft of the Guidelines. 143 The governing statute,
however, did not anticipate two important developments that sub
stantially retarded the rate at which the Guidelines went into use. 144
First, the Act did not envision that, while the Guidelines technically
became law in November 1987, constitutional challenges would pre
vent consistent nationwide application until January 1989. 145 Sec
ond, when Congress established the effective date for the Act, it
contemplated that the Guidelines would apply to all sentencing
proceedings occurring on the date after the Guidelines took effect,
but not to cases already in progress. 146 The second problem devel
oped after the Commission reviewed the considerable legal
problems stemming from the implementation of mandatory Guide
lines in conjunction with the abolishment of parole and "good
time"147 credits. 148 The Department of Justice and the Commission
advised Congress that a clear "bright line" rule was preferable to
desserts" and crime control philosophies because both camps recognize the wisdom of
looking to those distinctions that judges and legislators have made over time. See id.
These are distinctions that the judicial community believes to be important from either
a crime-control or moral perspective. See id.
139. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commis
sion's goals; see also Houser, supra note 130, at 364.
140. See supra note 138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the empirical
system.
141. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A
REpORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINE SYSTEM AND SHORT TERM IMPACTS
ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE
TION AND PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1991) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES REPORT].
142. See id. Congress was interested in evaluating the repercussions the Guide
lines had on the justice system to ensure justice and fairness were best being served.

See id.
143.
144.
145.
Mistretta
146.

See id.
See id.
See id. The Supreme Court held that the Guidelines are constitutional in
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES REpORT, supra note 141, at 1.

147. Good time credit is "awarded for good conduct and reduces [the] period of
sentence which [the] prisoner must spend in prison although it does not reduce the
period of the sentence itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
148. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES REpORT, supra note 141, at 1.
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the vague language that stated that the new Act and the Guidelines
would apply only to offenses committed after the November 1,1987
effective date,149 Consequently, in the Sentencing Act of 1987,
Congress recognized and attempted to rectify the potential problem
by "creating a more gradual, phased-in implementation scheme
pursuant to which the guidelines are applied to post-effective date
offenses as they are processed through the criminal justice
system."150
Although the statutory purpose of the Guidelines as stated in
the statutory text provides some insight into the impact the Guide
lines have on sentencing, it is important to explore the purpose of
the Guidelines and Congress' objective in creating them.
b.

Congressional intent

Prior to the Guidelines' enactment, hearings before the Sub
committee on Criminal Justice indicated various sentencing dispari
ties and inconsistencies. For instance, "the region in which the
defendant is convicted is likely to change the length of time served
from approximately six months more if one is sentenced in the
South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in Central Califor
nia. "151 During the hearings, Congress also discovered that gender
and race contributed to sentencing disparities. For instance, female
bank robbers were likely to serve six months less than their simi
larly situated male counterparts, and African American bank rob
bers convicted in the South were likely to serve approximately
thirteen months longer than similarly situated African American
bank robbers convicted in other regions.1 52
The objective of the Guidelines "is to avoid unwarranted sen
tencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct, while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing when war
ranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account
in the guidelines."153 As a result, the ability of the criminal justice
system to treat all defendants equally is enhanced by the
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Breyer, supra note 113, at 5 (quoting Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice on Sentencing Guidelines of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Ilene H.
Nagel, U.S. Sentencing Commissioner)).
152. See id.
153. 52 Fed. Reg. 3920 (1987).
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Guidelines. 154
To enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to treat all
defendants equally, Congress sought (1) honesty in sentencing
through the elimination of the parole system; (2) reasonable uni
formity in sentencing by eliminating the wide disparity of sentences
for similarly situated offenders; and (3) proportionality in sentenc
ing through appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct
of differing severity.1 55 Congress also hoped to move toward "a
process of accountability, greater uniformity, and articulated rea
sons for punishment. "156
Recognizing that the proscribed numerical calculations for sen
tencing mandated by the Guidelines would not encompass all of the
factors relevant to sentencing, Congress created a small number of
"departure exceptions" to restore some level of SUbjectivity to sen
tencing for appropriate cases. 157 Specifically, Congress determined
that one way of satisfying the goal of maintaining flexibility would
be to allow a sentence reduction if the defendant assisted in the
prosecution of other criminals. 15s
2.

Departure Exception: Section 5K1.1 Substantial
Assistance

Departure exceptions permit judges to depart from prescribed
Guideline ranges in two situations: (1) where the prosecutor moves
for downward departure on the basis of substantial assistance;159 or
(2) when there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the
Commission did not adequately take into consideration in formulat
ing the Guidelines. 16o The court has no power to deviate from the
154. See Schweickert, supra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the fairness and equality policies.
155. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 3922; see also Houser, supra note 130, at 363-65 (examin
ing the interplay between the goals of the Guidelines and their application).
156. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility,

Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 181 (1988).
157. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (1998). Most
departures in § 5K are provisions that allow a sentencing judge to increase a sentence
beyond the statutory maximum. See id. Some examples of departures include section
5K2.1, which allows a judge to increase a sentence if death resulted from the defend
ant's act; § 5K2.4 which allows for an increase if a hostage was taken or an abduction
took place; and § 5K2.8 which allows for an increase if the defendant's conduct was
"unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim." Id.
158. See id. § 5Kl.1.

159.
160.

See id.
See id. § 5K2.0; see also United States v. Doe, 870 F.Supp. 702, 706 (E.D. Va.

1994) (finding that the primary purpose of the departures is "to increase the percentage
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Guidelines unless extraordinary circumstances exist. 161
The Guidelines have significantly restricted the discretion en
joyed by present day sentencing judges in comparison to the free
reign judges enjoyed prior to the Guidelines. 162 Consequently, the
court's restricted sentencing power dramatically increases the
power of the prosecutor. 163 Specifically, section 5K1.1 gives the
prosecutor the power to decide whether a defendant may receive
potential leniency in recognition of his or her substantial assist
ance.1 64 Although assistance from the defendant can result in a
sentence reduction, a non-sequitur defendant's refusal to assist the
prosecutor in the investigation of other persons may not be consid
ered an aggravating sentencing factor.165
"Federal prosecutors have a particularly wide range of
[prosecutorial] choices [because] ... [m]ost federal offenses also
constitute state offenses. "166 Thus, prosecutors have enormous dis
cretion in the pre-trial phase of litigation. Additionally, even if only
federal charges are filed, federal statutes permit the prosecutor to
choose to prosecute the defendant under a variety of different
charges because of unsystematic and overlapping provisions. 167 As
a result, a defendant who commits one crime involving many vari
ables (such as a crime involving narcotics, the use of a firearm, and
of criminals who are successfully prosecuted for their crimes," and not to reward
criminals for wrongdoing).
161. See United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that
the government's motion is an unequivocal condition precedent to a downward depar
ture for defendant's cooperation); United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 293-94 (1st
Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992) (same).
162. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51
SMU L. REv. 469, 485 (1998) ("The Guidelines replaced what was largely unguided
trial court discretion in imposing criminal sentences with calibrated guidelines that sig
nificantly restricted trial court discretion.").
163. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 926 (1991) (discussing the prosecutor's pow
ers). The sentencing reform movement has not restricted sentencing discretion so much
as it has transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors. See id. See infra Part I.B.3
for further discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
164. See Lee, supra note 4, at 109 (stating that "[s]ince prosecutors historically
have been granted broad discretion in charging and bargaining, one might reasonably
question what harm exists in granting prosecutors a little more discretion in this limited
area of sentencing").
165. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.2 (1998) (stating that re
fusal to assist the prosecutor can not adversely effect the sentence the defendant ulti
mately receives).
166. David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881,892 (1996).
167. See id. at 892-94 (stating that the current discretion possessed by the prose
cutor causes "chaos" and reduces the overall predictability of sentencing).
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money in excess of $500) may be subject to ten different federal
charges, of which the prosecutor may decide which charges, if any,
the defendant will face at trial.
In 1994, substantial assistance departures constituted over sev
enty percent of all departures from the Guidelines. 168 The substan
tial assistance departure exception states that "[u]pon motion of the
Government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guide
lines. "169 The plain meaning of this clause provides that absent a
motion by the prosecutor, the court and the defendant do not have
the power to file this motion independently.17o An examination of
the legislative history also reveals that in 1989, Congress substituted
the word "provided" for "made a good faith effort to provide."I71
The purpose of the amendment was to clarify the Commission's in
tent that these departures were strictly for substantial assistance,
and not just a defendant's willingness to provide assistance. l72
Although the intent of Congress may have been to ensure that the
defendant provides actual assistance, studies have shown that in
practice the defendant need not provide actual assistance if the
prosecutor feels that the defendant is "deserving" of leniencyP3
The substantial assistance departure serves two purposes: (1)
the provision permits "ex post facto tailoring of defendants'
sentences to reflect meaningful assistance rendered" by defendants
and (2) "it provides defendants, ex ante, with an incentive to coop
erate in the administration of justice."174
Prosecutors have always had the discretion to decide what
cases to investigate, when to grant immunity, when to plea bargain,
168. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REp. 83 (1994).
169. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998).
170. See supra notes 5 & 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts'
inability to depart from the Guidelines absent a motion from the government.
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 290, at 672 (1998
99); see also Lee, supra note 4, at 111 n.16.
172. See Lee, supra note 4, at 111 n.16.
173. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Em
pirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guide
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 531 (1992). "Because of the flexibility introduced by
permitting a 5K1.1 motion for effort regardless of effect, this particular policy can be
used to reward sympathetic defendants who have not provided truly substantial help."
Id. "Furthermore, probation officers report that they sometimes learn ... that a de
fendant benefiting from a section 5K1.1 motion has not really done anything to assist
the government." Id.
174. United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993).
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and what recommendation to make under the Guidelines. 175 Prose
cutors also have the discretion to decide what, when, and where the
filing of charges will take place. 176 The Guidelines, however, have
had the effect of bestowing the prosecutor with an additional power
that directly affects the sentencing of the defendant. 177 This power
exists because only the prosecutor has the ability to file a substan
tial assistance motion, thus allowing the judge to deviate from the
harsh Guideline sentencing. 178 In essence, the prosecutor acts in
two capacities: as a prosecutor and as sentencing judge.
Although Congress attempted to limit sentencing discretion by
creating the Guidelines, it appears that in reality Congress has
shifted the discretion away from the judiciary into the hands of the
govemment. 179 Thus, prosecutorial discretion plays an important
role in understanding the use of plea bargains and, ultimately, sub
stantial assistance motions.

a

3.

Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion can be beneficial to both a defendant
who is attempting to receive a lighter sentence via a substantial
assistance motion and to the prosecutor who is trying to secure a
conviction. 180 Although the creation of the Guidelines has in
175. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 749.
176. See id.
177. See Lee, supra note 4, at 108 (describing that only the prosecutor has the
power to decide whether a defendant may receive leniency).
178. See Hon. Patti Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guide
lines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1027,1052
(1997) (stating that "[w]ithout a government motion, a court cannot depart downwards
below the guidelines range based on a defendant's substantial cooperation under sec
tion 5K1.1 'despite meanspiritedness or even arbitrariness on the government's part''')
(quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992)).
179. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 749.
180. See Guidorizzi, supra note 36, at 761-62 (stating that justifications for plea
bargaining include the great benefits provided to both the state and the defendant, as
well as its potential for encouraging rehabilitation and efficiency). But see Saris, supra
note 178. After examining the pros and cons of substantial assistance motions, Judge
Saris stated the following:
In short, downward departures based on substantial assistance motions are an
invitation to unwarranted, secret sentencing disparity. There is no judicial re
view of the government's decision whether to file a substantial assistance mo
tion, and as a practical matter, a sentencing court has unfettered discretion in
determining the extent of downward departures.
With respect to cooperating individuals, there is little assurance that a drug
trafficker in New Hampshire will receive the same sentence as one in Rhode
Island, or that even among cooperating defendants who are similarly situated
and cooperate in similar ways, that the sentences will be uniform....
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creased prosecutorial power, this discretion is not completely unfet
tered. 181 For example, the decision to file a downward departure
motion, as with other methods of enforcing criminal laws, 182 cannot
be based on racial prejudices.
While prosecutors do not have unfettered discretion, judges
will, as rule of thumb, defer to a prosecutor's decisions to initiate
and conduct criminal prosecutions. 183 The basis for this deference
is that courts acknowledge that the numerous complex decisions
prosecutors must make are ill-suited for judicial review.1 84 There
fore, there is a rebuttable presumption that prosecutors undertake
prosecutions in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner. 18S
There have been many constitutional challenges to the Guide
lines, and more specifically to the requirement that the prosecutor
file a substantial assistance motion prior to a sentence reduction,
but none of these challenges have been successful. 186 The Supreme
Id. at 1049.
181. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 748-53 for a discussion of prosecutorial
discretion.
182. Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is subject to constitutional
constraints. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also Fisher, supra
note 99, at 750. There are two basic constitutional attacks: (1) vindictive prosecution
(which violates a defendant's due process rights) and (2) selective or discriminatory
prosecution (which denies a defendant equal protection of the laws). See id. For exam
ple, a prosecutor cannot selectively prosecute based on racial prejudices. See Wayte,
470 U.S. at 608. Likewise, a prosecutor cannot refuse to file a substantial assistance
motion based on the defendant's race or religion. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S.
181, 185-86 (1992).
183. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating that "so long
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion").
184. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (stating that "[s]uch factors as the strength of the
case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priori
ties, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake");
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that "prosecutorial
discretion has long been recognized as sacrosanct"); see also Fisher, supra note 99, at
750 (stating that prosecutorial discretion involves various decisions that the judiciary is
not equipped to review).
185. See Smith, 375 F.2d at 248; see also Fisher, supra note 99, at 750 & n.36.
186. See generally United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1992)
(stating that a provision requiring that the Government move for downward departure
due to substantial assistance does not violate substantial due process); United States v.
Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that requiring cooperation prior
to filing a motion for downward departure does not violate due process guarantees);
United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no consti
tutional right to a substantial assistance motion); United States v. Spees, 911 F.2d 126,
127 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the requirement that the government file a motion prior
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Court has also held that when a prosecutor specifically agrees to act
pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor is bound to the exact
terms of the agreement. 187 Thus, if a written plea agreement does
not include a sole discretion clause, but rather states that in return
for a guilty plea the prosecutor will file a substantial assistance mo
tion upon the defendant's agreement to testify for the government,
the prosecutor is bound to perform once the defendant provides
testimony.188 The decision to enter into a plea agreement with a
promise to file a substantial assistance motion, however, rests com
pletely with the discretion of the prosecution. 189
The United States Supreme Court has not directly dealt with
the balance between prosecutorial discretion and a defendant's
right to have a substantial assistance motion filed. 190 However, the
Court has broadly examined the extent of prosecutorial discretion
in the context of prosecuting defendants.
In Wayte v. United States,191 the government instituted a "pas
sive enforcement" policyl92 in which the government prosecuted
only persons who reported themselves to the government as having
failed to register for the draft. The United States Attorney at
tempted to prosecute this defendant under a passive enforcement
policy.193 The defendant argued that "passive enforcement" is un
constitutional on equal protection grounds. 194
to imposition of downward departure does not violate separation of powers or due
process); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035-36 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that
cooperation with the prosecutor does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
371 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines).
187. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
188. Cf id. (stating that "circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled").
189. See generally Fisher, supra note 99, at 749.
190. See generally Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). Although Wade
dealt with a substantial assistance motion, there was no written plea agreement between
the prosecutor and defendant. See id. at 183.
191. 470 U.S. 598 (1985). In Wayte, the defendant refused to register with the
Selective Service and wrote letters to several government officials proclaiming his in
tent to continue to do so. See id. at 601.
192. See id.; see also United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1987)
(stating that under a passive enforcement policy, the "government selected for prosecu
tion only those who reported themselves or were reported by others as having violated
the registration requirement," and all others who remained silent or unreported were
not sought out for prosecution).
193. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 603.
194. See id. at 604 (moving for dismissal on the ground of selective prosecution).
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The Court held that passive enforcement is permissible in some
instances, noting that "although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it
is not unfettered," and thus is ultimately subject to constitutional
constraints. 195 The justices in Wayte disagreed on the appropriate
standard for evaluating selective prosecution claims. 196 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, used a standard equal protection
analysis. 197 In order to succeed on such a claim, the defendant must
show that the policy used had a "discriminatory effect and was mo
tivated by a discriminatory purpose."198 By contrast, the dissent ar
gued that in order to establish a prima facie case of selective
prosecution on equal protection grounds, the defendant must show
that (1) "he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class;" (2) "a
disproportionate number of the class was selected for investigation
and possible prosecution;" and (3) "this selection procedure was
subject to abuse or was otherwise not neutral. "199
Ultimately, although the justices disagreed as to the exact test
to be applied to prosecutorial discretion, the Court recognized that
prosecutors are given broad discretion regarding who to prosecute,
and the Court concluded that prosecutorial discretion is not "unfet
tered."2°O Thus, while the Supreme Court did not specifically dis
cuss plea agreements in Wayte, the Court made it clear that
prosecutorial discretion is bound by constitutionallimits. 201 How
ever, two Supreme Court cases have directly discussed different as
pects of plea agreements in other contexts.
195. Id. at 608 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979), in
which the Court held that the decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based on
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification") (inter
nal quotations omitted).
196. Arguments against constitutionality were made on First Amendment
grounds (using the O'Brien test), due process grounds, and equal protection standards.
See id. at 608-14.
197. See id. at 608.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
494 (1977».
200. See id. at 608. The Court recognized, however, that prosecutorial discretion
should be limited in only certain circumstances because:
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens
to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decision
making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All of these are substantial
concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision
whether to prosecute.
Id. at 607-08.
201. See id. at 608.
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4. Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Plea Agreements
The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether a court
may review a prosecutor's refusal to file a downward departure mo
tion when the plea agreement grants the government "sole discre
tion." In fact, the Court has rarely discussed plea agreements and
prosecutorial discretion. 2OO However, two Supreme Court cases,
Santo bello v. New York 203 and Wade v. United States,204 provide dis
tinct frameworks for considering prosecutorial reviewability and
the use of contract principles.

a.

Santobello v. New York

In Santo bello , the Supreme Court held that when a prosecutor
fails to abide by the specific terms of a plea agreement, the court
may grant the defendant specific performance of the terms of the
plea agreement. 205 In Santobello, the plea agreement obligated the
prosecutor to not make any sentencing recommendation to the
judge in return for Santobello's guilty plea. 206 When sentencing fi
nally occurred, after a series of delays and counsel changes by both
the prosecutor and the defendant, the new prosecutor recom
mended the maximum sentence to the sentencing judge.207 The
202. Although the plea is an integral part of the justice system, the United States
Supreme Court has rarely discussed the issue in its holdings. See, e.g., United States v.
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995); United States
v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994);
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563
(1989).
203. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
204. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
205. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. In Santobello, the defendant was indicted
in New York on two felony gambling charges. See id. at 258. Petitioner entered a plea
of not guilty on both counts. See id. After negotiations between the prosecutor and the
defendant, the prosecutor permitted the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser included
offense that carried a maximum sentence of one year. See id. According to the lower
court:
[Where] the defendant's plea of guilty was entirely voluntary and [was] in
tended in itself as a complete act and a final disposition of the charges against
him, with the sentencing function to be exercised as matter of course following
a performance of the prosecutor's promise .... There was no coercion or over
reaching on the part of the prosecution ... due process and the interests of
justice will be fully served by a remand for resentence with the specific per
formance of the prosecutor's promise.
People v. Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
206. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258.
207. See id. at 259. The prosecution listed variables such as Santobello's criminal
record and his alleged links with organized crime to justify the recommendation. See id.
Over vigorous objections, defense counsel was overruled. See id.
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judge sentenced the petitioner to the maximum one year sentence
as recommended. 208
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the
Court to review the prosecutor's decision to deviate from the spe
cific terms of the plea agreement. 209 On review, Santobello argued
that since he had fulfilled his part of the bargain by pleading guilty,
and the prosecutor failed to fu1fi11 his promise not to make a sen
tencing recommendation, he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea. 2Io The Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fu1fi11ed. "211 In reaching its decision, the
Court acknowledged that plea agreements are important in the ad
ministration of justice both at the state and federal level and serve
an important role in the disposition of most cases. 212 Justice Doug
las, in concurrence, stated that if the parties enter into a plea agree
ment, and one party reneges on the agreement, the plea is void
because courts must promote "an outraged sense of fairness."213 In
support of this conclusion, Justice Marshall, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, stated that when a prosecutor breaks an agreed
upon element of the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver
of the defendant's constitutional rights implicit in the plea. 214
The Supreme Court's use of contract terminology in Santobello
has led some circuit courts to apply basic contract principles when
208. See id. at 260. Pending appeal, the defendant sought and obtained bail after
the judge imposed the maximum sentence of one year. See id. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the petitioner's
conviction and denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. See id. The
petitioner then sought and obtained certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See
id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 263.
211. Id. at 262.
212. See id. at 260-61. "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement be
tween the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administra
tion of justice." Id. at 260. According to the Court, the number of defendants far
exceeds judicial capacity. See id.
213. Justice Douglas stated that the Court should set up a new constitutional rule
when a plea bargain is not kept by the prosecutor. See id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concur
ring). When the plea bargain is breached, the sentence should be vacated, and the state
court must decide whether to order (a) specific performance of the original plea bargain
or (b) a new trial on the original charges. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
214. Justice Marshall believed that the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement
was enough evidence to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and have a
new trial ordered. See id. at 267-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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reviewing the government's refusal to file a substantial assistance
motion pursuant to a plea agreement. 215 These circuits have held
that if the prosecutor breached a plea agreement with the defend
ant, the court is then empowered to grant specific performance or
permit withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea. 216 In contrast, the
remaining circuits have held that the holding in Santobello only ap
plies to plea agreements in which the prosecutor expressly agrees to
do something, and therefore Santo bello is not applicable to "sole
discretion" plea agreements in which the prosecutor expressly
reserves the right to independently consider the value of the assist
ance given by the defendant. 217 These courts hold that only when
defendants plead guilty in return for government concessions are
the defendants legally entitled to the agreed upon concession. 218
While Santobello addressed the enforceability of plea agree
ments that do not contain sole discretion language, the Supreme
Court did not address the issue of substantial assistance until Wade
v. United States. 219 Specifically, Wade addressed whether, in the ab
sence of a plea agreement, a defendant may challenge a prosecu
tor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. 220
b.

Wade v. United States

In Wade,221 the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor is em
powered to file a substantial assistance motion,222 and the court
215. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691
(D.C. Cir 1995); United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
Gyurci, supra note 13, at 1268-70 (discussing the application of contract principles to
plea bargains).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1992); see also, Gyurci, supra note 13, at
1269 & n.82 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring».
217. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the circuits that have held that there is
no power to review a prosecutor's decision not to file a 5K1.1 motion.
218. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1953.
219. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
220. See id. at 183-86.
221. In Wade, the police arrested the defendant on federal drug charges, to which
he plead gUilty. See id. at 183. Prior to sentencing, the defendant offered law enforce
ment officials information that led to the arrest of another dealer. See id. The defend
ant offered this information without any written plea agreement. See id. The judge
sentenced the defendant to the Guidelines' ten-year statutory minimum sentence. See
id. The defendant requested that the court reduce the sentence below the minimum
standard to reward him for his substantial assistance to the government. See id. The
court denied the defendant's request. See id.
222. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantial
assistance.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

182

[Vol. 22:149

may review the prosecutor's refusal to file the motion only in situa
tions where an unconstitutional motive prompted the prosecutor's
decision. 223 Therefore, the Court held that the prosecutor's discre
tion to file a substantial assistance motion is subject only to consti
tutional lirnitations.224 The defendant's dissatisfaction with the
prosecutor's evaluation of the assistance is insufficient to trigger ju
dicial review unless accompanied by unconstitutional motives. 225
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Congress gave the govern
ment the power to file a downward departure motion, and not a
duty to do SO.226
Although neither Santo bello nor Wade directly address the is
sue of whether courts have the power to review a prosecutor's deci
sion not to file a sole discretion substantial assistance motion, these
cases provide the necessary background to understanding the cur
rent split among the circuits.

II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:

To

REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW

The current split in the United States Courts of Appeals con
cerning the reviewability of a prosecutor's decision to file a sole
discretion substantial assistance motion has centered on the appli
cability of Wade or Santobello, as well as other basic contract prin
ciples.227 The Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions
regarding the nature of the plea agreement itself.228 Specifically,
the courts must decide whether sole discretion substantial assist
ance plea agreements are tools by which prosecutors may exercise
complete discretion, or whether plea agreements constitute con
tracts that courts may review using basic contract principles. The
223. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86 ("[W]e see no reason why courts should treat a
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion differently from a prosecu
tor's other decisions ... [and] we hold that federal district courts have authority to
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a rem
edy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive.").
224. See id. at 186. "Thus, a defendant would be entitled to relief if a prosecutor
refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say, because of the defendant's race or
religion." Id.
225. See id. A mere claim that a defendant provided substantial assistance is not
enough to trigger a judicial review. See id. Generalized allegations of improper motive
are also not enough. See id. A defendant has "no right to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing unless he makes a 'substantial threshold showing'" of prejudicial prosecutorial
behavior. Id.
226. See id. at 185.
227. See Lee, supra note 4, at 168 (discussing the issue of prosecutorial discretion
in general).
228. See infra Part II.A and II.B for a discussion of the circuit split.
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non-reviewing circuits do not apply contract theory when reviewing
a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion.
In contrast, the reviewing circuits perform a contract-based review.
The decisions of the non-reviewing circuits, comprised of the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,229 form an
overwhelming majority when compared to the circuits that allow
courts to review a prosecutor's decision to not file a substantial
assistance motion, which include the District of Columbia, Second,
and Third Circuits.230
A.

Courts Do Not Have the Power to Review a Prosecutor's
Refusal to File a Sole Discretion Substantial Assistance
Motion

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (collectively referred to
as the "non-reviewing circuits") have held that courts do not have
jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial
assistance motion absent unconstitutional motivations.231 The non
reviewing circuits hold that Wade directly applies to sole discretion
plea agreement cases even though the defendant in Wade had no
plea agreement. Therefore, these courts do not review
prosecutorial discretion other than where decisions are based upon
unconstitutional grounds. 232 As such, these circuits hold that courts
do not have jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's decision not to file
a 5K1.1 motion, even if a defendant alleges bad faith or improper
229. See infra Part II.A for a thorough discussion of the circuits that do not re
view a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
230. See infra Part n.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts
to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Moses, No. 97-4321, 97-4193, 1998 WL 67795 (4th
Cir. Feb. 20, 1998); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Mote, No. 95
30372,1996 WL 528437 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996); United States v. Padilla, No. 95-1282,
1995 WL 590451 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90 (6th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fairchild, 940
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1991).
232. See Mote, 1996 WL 528437, at *2 (stating that Mote failed to meet the sub
stantial threshold requirement); Price, 95 F.3d at 367-68 (per curiam) (stating that ac
cording to Wade, "[a]bsent a motion for downward departure made by the
Government, a sentencing court is without authority to grant a downward departure on
the basis of substantial assistance under § SKU") (citing Wade v. United States, 504
U.S. 181, 184 (1992»; see also United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991)
(stating that absent an agreement, the government alone has the right to decide
whether or not to file the motion for downward departure).
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motive. 233 For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant
is not entitled" 'to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing' unless the prosecution relied on an unconstitutional motive
in refusing to file a 5K1.1 motion."234
In addition, these courts also hold that a defendant's claim that
he provided substantial assistance does not entitle a defendant to
judicial intervention. 235 Because the government has the ultimate
discretion to file the motion, "a defendant's assertion of 'good faith'
is irrelevant."236 Specifically, "[n]othing a defendant does, up to
and including a 'good faith' effort to assist the government, guaran
tees him a substantial assistance departure."237
The non-reviewing circuits recognize that the prosecution can
bargain away its discretion by specifically stating what the defend
ant must do in order for the assistance to be considered substan
tial.238 In essence, this type of agreement would remove
233. See Raynor, 939 F.2d at 195 (stating that absent an agreement in which the
government expressly agrees to file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant has
no right to question the government's motives when the government fails to file the
motion) (citing United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 504 U.S.
181 (1992».
234. See United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Wade, 504 U.S. at 186); accord Price, 95 F.3d at 367-68 ("5KU does not require the
government to move for a downward departure if the defendant provides substantial
assistance, but rather grants the government discretionary power to make such a mo
tion") (quoting Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740,
743-44 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court denied the plaintiff's request for a review
of the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion since there was no
allegation of unconstitutionality); United States v. Underwood, 61 F.3d 306, 312 (5th
Cir. 1995) (stating that the government did not bargain away its discretion, therefore
the plaintiff's issue was without merit).
235. See United States v. Sims, No. 95-5116, 1992 WL 190909, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug.
11, 1992) (unpublished opinion) (finding that the district court can only inquire into the
government's decision not to file a section 5K1.1 motion if the defendant can make a
"substantial showing" that the refusal was unconstitutional) (citing Wade, 504 U.S. at
186); see also Price, 95 F.3d at 368-69 (stating that a refusal to file a substantial assist
ance motion is only reviewable for unconstitutional motives).
236. Fairchild, 940 F.2d at 266. Likewise, the court has rejected the notion that
the court can order departure under 5K1.1 if the prosecutor failed to make the motion
in "bad faith." See United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1992).
237. Fairchild, 940 F.2d at 266. See generally Burrell, 963 F.2d at 985. In Burrell,
the defendant challenged the plea agreement's sole discretion clause because he felt
that he had divulged "substantial" information by helping the government obtain a
guilty plea against his accomplice. See id. at 984. Because the defendant never argued
that the denial was based on unconstitutional grounds, the court determined that it had
no power to review the prosecutor's decision not to file the motion, regardless of the
extent of the actual assistance. See id. at 985. According to the court, there is no review
for arbitrariness or bad faith. See id.
238. See United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228,230 (4th Cir. 1993) ('''[W]hen a
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prosecutorial discretion and objectify the relationship between the
prosecutor and the defendant. Once a prosecutor does this, and the
defendant offers the specified objective "substantial assistance," the
prosecutor must file the 5K1.1 motion regardless of the prosecutor's
overall dissatisfaction with the defendant's assistance. 239 Thus, the
non-reviewing circuits have recognized that when a defendant ne
gotiates a plea agreement that includes the government's agree
ment to file a motion for downward departure under section 5K1.1,
the defendant obtains the right to require the government to fulfill
its promise. 240 However, absent an agreement to do so, the govern
ment has the right to decide, in its sole discretion, whether to file a
motion for downward departure based upon the government's sub
jective impression of the defendant's substantial assistance. 241
Specifically, a violation of the terms of a plea agreement is a
"question of law that is reviewed de novo" and the defendant has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
underlying facts establish a breach of the plea agreement. 242 In deplea rests in any significant degree on a promise ... such promise must be fulfilled."')
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971»; cf United States v. Cour
tois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
stated that the specific language of the agreement is the determinative factor as to
whether the government has bargained away their discretion. See id. at 937. Where the
prosecutor reserves sole discretion to decide whether or not to file a substantial assist
ance motion, the language of the agreement does not obligate the government to file a
§ 5KU motion. See id. at 939. Therefore, "[e]ven if the defendant undeniably renders
substantial assistance, the government retains discretion to decide whether to request a
§ 5K1.1 downward departure." Id. at 938.
239. See Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938-39.
240. See United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that
"when a defendant is able to negotiate a plea agreement that includes the government's
agreement to file a motion for downward departure ... the defendant obtains rights to
require the government to fulfill its promise") (citing United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d
169,173 (4th Cir. 1991»; see also Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938-39 (same); Price, 95 F.3d at
368 (same); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
241. See Courtois, 131 F.3d at 938 (stating that the government always retains
discretion to determine whether to file a 5K1.1 motion). The non-reviewing courts
seem to imply that a defendant who enters into a sole discretion substantial assistance
plea agreement does so at the risk of prosecutorial dissatisfaction and with no judicial
remedy. See Raynor, 939 F.2d at 195.
242. See Price, 95 F.3d at 367; United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th
Cir. 1993). In Garcia-Bonilla, the plea agreement provided:
The United States reserves its option to seek any departure from the applica
ble sentencing guidelines, pursuant to Section 5K of the Sentencing Guidelines
and Policy Statements, or Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure
[sic], if in its discretion, it is determined that such a departure is appropriate.
The defendant agrees that the decision whether to file such a motion rests
within the sole discretion of the United States.
Id.
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termining whether the government has violated a plea agreement,
the court must first determine whether "the government's conduct
is consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the
agreement."243 Thus, where both parties understood that the pros
ecutor would use its sole discretion to determine whether or not to
file a substantial assistance motion, the defendant may not question
the government's decision not to file. 244 In such a situation, the
"defendant is not entitled to a hearing" under Wade unless the re
fusal to file the 5Kl.l motion was based on an unconstitutional
motive. 245
Second, the court must examine the specific language of the
plea agreement, because the question of whether or not the prose
cutor retained his or her discretion to file a substantial assistance
motion turns upon the specific language in the agreement. The
non-reviewing circuits have held that the prosecutor has only bar
gained away his or her discretion if the plea agreement expressly
states that the prosecutor has done SO.246 Moreover, the prosecutor
retains the sole discretion to determine if he or she will file a sub
stantial assistance motion, notwithstanding the fact that an agree
ment does not include an objective definition of sole discretion. 247
Taking a slightly different approach, the Ninth Circuit has ac
knowledged that plea agreements are contractual in nature,248 and
243. See Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46 (quoting United States v. Valencia, 985
F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993»; see also United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337
n.7 (9th Cir. 1993). In De la Fuente, the court stated:
[A]s a practical matter, because we employ objective standards-it is the par
ties' or defendant's reasonable beliefs that control-the difference between
stating that the defendant's or the parties' beliefs control is minimal. The con
struction we adopt, however, incorporates the general rule that ambiguities
are construed in favor of the defendant.
Id.
244. See Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 47.
245. See United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing Wade's
holding that a court only has the authority "to review the Government's failure to move
for a downward departure ... if the court finds that the refusal was based on an uncon
stitutional motive").
246. See Price, 95 F.3d at 369 (finding that "the government may bargain away its
discretion under the terms of a plea agreement, and thereby obligate itself to move for a
downward departure in exchange for the defendant's substantial assistance"); United
States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1996); Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46-47.
247. See United States v. Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 1999). If the prosecutor
reserves the sole discretion to decide whether or not to file a motion, the court cannot
review the prosecutor's decision not to do so absent some evidence of unconstitutional
motives. See id. Therefore, implicit in the term sole discretion is unreviewability.
248. See United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[p]lea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law stan
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has held that the court may consider what the defendant reasonably
understood when he entered into the plea agreement. 249 However,
the court has yet to make such a holding in the context of a substan
tial assistance plea agreement. Notwithstanding the defendant's ex
pectations, the courts have ultimately held that the government's
sole discretion usually prevails. 250 Some circuits, choosing not to
follow the non-reviewing circuits, have held that fairness requires
that prosecutorial discretion be reviewed by the court in certain
circumstances. 251

B.

Courts Do Have the Power to Review a Prosecutor's Refusal
to File a Substantial Assistance Motion

The dissent in United States v. Forney,252 which strongly pro
tested the majority opinion shared by the circuit courts that disal
low review of prosecutorial discretion, best sums up the reasoning
behind allowing reviewability:
The majority holds that regardless of the extent of [the defend
ant's] cooperation, the government is obligated to do absolutely
nothing. This result is inconsistent with Supreme Court prece
dents governing plea agreements, with principles of contract law,
and with fundamental fairness. The government promised to
consider filing a 5Kl.l motion; it must be required to act in good
faith in fulfilling this promise. As with any other promise in a
plea agreement, the district court must ensure that this promise is
fulfilled.253
dards," yet are not reviewable under contract law theory); see also United States v.
Mote, No. 95-30372, 1996 WL 528437, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished deci
sion); United States v. Floyd, 1 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1993).
249. See United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In
construing an agreement, the court must determine what the defendant reasonably un
derstood to be the terms of the agreement when he pleaded guilty.") (citing United
States v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by, 990 F.2d 1163 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
250. See Mote, 1996 WL 528437, at *1. The plea agreement included the follow
ing language: "the government alone will determine [if] it will apply for any additional
offense level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or FED. R. Cry. P. 35 in return for your
client's full and truthful cooperation." Id. "The (prosecutor] did not breach the plea
agreement because the parties stipulated ... that the decision to file a motion for a
substantial assistance departure was solely within the government's discretion." Id.
Because the agreement was clear and unambiguous, no breach occurred. See id.; see
also United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1996).
251. See infra Part H.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts
to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
252. 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993).
253. Id. at 1504 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
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According to the dissent, a district court judge is not only author
ized to examine the prosecutor's discretion based on contract prin
ciples, but is obligated to do so in order to ensure fairness. 254
Following this basic premise, a number of circuits have concluded
that plea agreements include the same elements as contracts,255 and
therefore, a prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance
motion is reviewable using the basic contract principle of good
faith.256
For example, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia has held that a district court may examine a plea
agreement to ensure that the defendant and the prosecutor have
fulfilled all previously agreed upon contingent obligations. 257 In ad
dition, even where a plea agreement does not guarantee that the
government will file a 5Kl.l motion, all plea agreements include an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, as well as an obli
gation that the government make an honest and informed
decision. 258
Reviewing circuits have also criticized plea bargaining agree
ments that contain sole discretion clauses as a whole. 259 For exam
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit criticized plea agreements as
granting United States Attorneys "extraordinary power" since only
the government can act by filing a 5Kl.l motion prior to any type of
254. See id. (Clarke, J., dissenting).
255. See infra note 304 and accompanying text for the definition of a contract.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Profeta, No. 91-3224,
1993 WL 185730, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1993) (unpublished opinion); United States v.
Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990).
257. See United States v. Sparks, 20 F.3d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that
"[t]he only government obligation is a contingent one: 'if the Departure Guideline
Committee ... determines that [the defendant] has provided substantial assistance ...,
then this Office will file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.c. § 3553(e), and 5K1.1.' If the
contingency is not fulfilled, the departure motion is not filed. Period."); see also Jones,
58 F.3d at 689. In Jones, the United States Attorney indicted a United States postal
employee on one count of theft of mail and one count of forgery. See id. at 689-90. The
appellant entered into a plea agreement that gave the prosecution the discretion to file
a 5K1.1 motion upon a finding that the defendant substantially assisted in the prosecu
tion of another. See id. at 690. When the government did not file a section 5K1.1, the
appellant moved the court to compel the government to file the motion. See id. The
district court ultimately held that the language of the agreement "created only a contin
gent obligation," and thus, the government had no obligation to file the motion. Id. at
691.
258. See Jones, 58 F.3d at 692.
259. See id. at 691 ("Although we are satisfied that the Government fulfilled its
obligations under the plea agreement, [certain] aspects of the case trouble us.").
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sentencing departure. 26o This power could result in the prosecutor
using the 5Kl.l motion as an improper tool of persuasion:
"[P]rosecutors might dangle the suggestion of a section 5Kl.l mo
tion in front of defendants to lure them into plea agreements, all
the while knowing that defendant's cooperation could not possibly
constitute assistance valuable enough [to be considered]
'substantial.' "261
The Second Circuit has recognized that where there is a coop
eration agreement that provides for a downward departure motion,
and that agreement incorporates substantial assistance language,
the discretion of the prosecutor is generally the sole determinant
when evaluating the quantity of useful information.262 However,
the court further recognized that although "criminal sentencing
proceedings are not the same as civil contract disputes,"263 courts
may nonetheless interpret plea agreements with principles bor
rowed from the law of contracts. 264 Accordingly, as in contracts,
there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every
plea agreement. 265 "Consequently, the prosecution's determination
that it is dissatisfied with the defendant's performance under the
cooperation agreement-as with other areas of prosecutorial dis
cretion-may not be reached dishonestly or in bad faith."266
260. See id. The court recognized that the defendant's only chance of obtaining a
sentence outside of the Guideline grid was through prosecutorial discretion.
261. Id. at 691-92; cf United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the court was concerned that the government had failed to objectively
define substantial assistance within the plea agreement).
262. See United States v. Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[w]ith such broad discretionary power, prosecutors would have little incentive to mis
use cooperation agreements and renege on their promises to move for downward de
partures") (citing United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989».
263. Id. at 1105 (citing Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1988».
264. See id. (citing United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Carbone, 739 F.2d 45, 46 (2d. Cir. 1984».
265. See id. (stating that "[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which precludes each party from engaging in conduct that will
deprive the other party of the benefits of their agreement") (citing Filner v. Shapiro,
633 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added». "Good faith is defined in Uniform
Commercial Code § 1-201(19) as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con
cerned.'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONfRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (citation omit
ted). "Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith'
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id.
266. Kahn, 920 F.2d at 1105 (finding that the prosecutor could not substitute a
more serious charge at the new trial after defendant's successful appeal) (citing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974»; United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207,
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The reviewing circuits have further stated that although the
prosecutor reserves sole discretion, the sole discretion does not
grant the court the power to disregard the Supreme Court's holding
in Santobello v. New York. 267 For example, in United States v. Cer
tuche ,268 responding to the defendant's motion to compel the gov
ernment to file a 5K1.1 motion, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that courts must adhere to all agreements" 'unless the
government's proffered explanation for withholding the section
5Kl.l motion is "wholly insufficient" or unless the defendant's ver
sion of events, supported by at least some evidence, contradicts the
government's ... .' "269
While the reviewing circuits have acknowledged that
prosecutorial discretion is essential in the judicial system, they have
concluded that it does not outweigh the importance of fairness to a
defendant. 270 For example, in United States v. Knights,271 the court
stated that "[b]ecause the prosecution often is in the best position
to evaluate the quality of a defendant's cooperation and to decide
whether to make a substantial assistance motion, this decision, like
other prosecutorial determinations, may be subjected to ... limited
review."272 Thus, the Knights decision permits judicial review to
ensure fairness to the defendant, although the review is somewhat
limited.
When a cooperation agreement allows for a substantial assist
ance motion contingent on the government's subjective evaluation
1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that an allegation of intentional and purposeful discrimina
tion leading to selective prosecution required further investigation).
267. 404 U.S. 257 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d
Cir. 1998); United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992); Kahn, 920 F.2d
at 1105.
268. No. 97-1327, 1998 WL 537778, at *2 (2d Cir. July 29, 1998) (unpublished
decision). In Certuche, one of the defendants (Aguirre) entered into a section 5K1.1
sole discretion plea agreement after being charged with several narcotic violations. See
id. The defendant then moved to compel a 5K1.1 filing after the government refused to
do so. See id.
269. Id. (quoting United States v. Imitaz, 81 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1996)).
270. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483 (stating that the defendant gives up his right to a
"fair trial" when he signs a plea agreement and therefore should be afforded a "good
faith" assistance evaluation by the prosecutor).
271. 968 F.2d 1483 (2d Cir. 1992). In Knights, the defendant pled guilty to drug
offenses pursuant to a plea agreement. See id. at 1485. The plea agreement provided
that the government would move for a substantial assistance motion if, in the govern
ment's sole and unfettered discretion, the defendant had met the government's expecta
tions. See id.
272. Id. at 1487 (citing United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d at 710, 713 (2d Cir.
1990)).
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of a defendant's efforts to cooperate, the district court may review
whether the prosecution based its decision on unconstitutional con
siderations, such as religion, race, or "'whether the prosecutor has
made its determination in good faith."'273 Most of the reviewing
circuits have stated that Wade is not authoritative because it is inap
plicable to sole discretion plea agreement cases. This is due to the
fact that the Wade Court did not deal with a written plea agree
ment. The reviewing circuits agree that plea agreements are a sim
ple matter of contract law, once the court determines that there is a
contractual relationship between the defendant and the govern
ment. 274 If the plea agreement contemplates a motion, a contrac
tual relationship exists and the district court is free to apply
contract principles to determine whether the provisions of the
agreement are met. 275
"When a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement,
he gives up his rights to a fair trial, confrontation, and a potential
acquittal by a jury; the government, in return, secures its conviction
without effort or risk."276 Thus, reviewing courts have stated that
defendants reasonably expect the government to act in good faith,
and therefore any claim to the contrary allows some level of exami
nation by the district court.277
Those judges dissenting from the courts' ability to review
273. Id. (quoting Rexach, 896 F.2d at 714).
274. See United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that
'''[p]lea agreements are unique contracts in which special due process concerns for fair
ness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards [apply]"') (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that courts may apply gen
eral fairness principles to invalidate particular terms of a plea agreement). In United
States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1998), the court noted that:
[T]he government frequently will agree as part of a plea agreement to consider
whether to offer a § 5K1.1 motion. In such a case, even if the government
reserves "sole discretion" to determine whether to offer a motion, a district
court has authority to depart downward for substantial assistance when the
government's refusal to offer a motion is "attributable to bad faith." This ex
ception derives from contract law .... [Contract law principles] apply because,
without them, the defendant would be deprived of the benefit of his plea bar
gain and his plea would be involuntary.
Id. (citing Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483-84; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971».
275. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 482 ("We treat[] the issue of compliance with the plea
agreement as a straight-forward matter of contract law ....").
276. Id. at 483.
277. "When the agreement contains a [sole discretion] § 5Kl.1 provision ... it is
not the case that the clause regarding government discretion deprives the defendant of
any reasonable expectation of receiving something in return for the surrender of his
rights." Id. Defendants do not strike illusory bargains with the prosecutor simply be
cause the prosecutor retained sole discretion. See id.
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prosecutorial discretion have argued against review for fear of an
overall breakdown in prosecutorial discretion and efficiency.278
Understanding that prosecutorial discretion is necessary to success
fully prosecute criminals, a fear of judicial review may hamper their
ability to successfully prosecute. Notwithstanding the dissenters'
opinions, and the holdings of the non-reviewing circuits, the bene
fits of applying contract theory to sole discretion substantial assist
ance plea agreements outweigh the drawbacks.

278. In Isaac, the defendant entered into a plea agreement in which the govern
ment agreed to file a section 5K1.1 motion if "in its sole discretion," the government
determined that the defendant had fulfilled his obligation of cooperation. See id. at
479. The court found that sole discretion did not give the prosecutor unfettered discre
tion, and thus his decision not to file the substantial assistance motion was reviewable
by the judiciary. See id. at 481-84. The dissent agreed with the majority that Santo bello
v. New York provides the analytical framework for evaluating the terms of a plea agree
ment. See id. at 485 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). However, the dissent disagreed with
the majority's decision to find that Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), was
inapplicable. See id. at 486-87 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). The dissent decided that
extensive judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion will prove detrimental to the
criminal justice system and will have a chilling effect on prosecutorial effectiveness. See
id. at 488 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (discussing Wade and Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598 (1985), generally). The dissent reasoned that congressional intent conferred
prosecutorial discretion upon the government for the purpose of recommending a de
parture from the Sentencing Guidelines due to a defendant's substantial assistance. See
id. at 489 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Further, a prosecutor's refusal to file a section
5K1.1 motion should be evaluated like all other prosecutorial decisions, and therefore,
should only be subject to judicial review if the defendant can make a substantial show
ing of an unconstitutional motive. See id. at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). The fact
that Wade did not involve a plea agreement was irrelevant because the underlying hold
ing of the Supreme Court was that review of plea bargaining discretion is only permissi
ble for unconstitutional motives, and not merely for an accusation that the defendant
substantially assisted in their own opinion. See id. at 487 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
When a defendant and prosecutor enter into a sole discretion plea agreement, the par
ties' expectations are that the defendant is in effect bargaining away the right of anyone
else to examine the government's discretion. See id. at 486 (Mansmann, J., dissenting)
(stating that" 'once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in
the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agree
ment''') (quoting United States v. Connor, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir. 1991». Thus,
even under the standards set forth in Santobello, the district court is not permitted to
review a plea agreement if that plea agreement specifically bargained away the discre
tion of the court and the right of the defendant to question the reasoning of the govern
ment. See id. at 487-89 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Rather, a plea agreement can only
be examined if the government has expressly agreed to do something, and then failed to
perform on that promise. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.A for a
thorough discussion of other circuits that do not allow judicial review of a prosecutor's
refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF

APPLYING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO SOLE DISCRETION
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE MOTIONS

This analysis examines three issues related to viewing plea bar
gains as contracts. First, this section examines the applicability of
Wade to written plea agreements, including an examination of judi
cial reviewability of prosecutorial discretion. 279 Second, this section
examines sole discretion and the applicability of contract principles,
including a discussion of the applicability of Santobello and four
contract defenses which may apply to the enforceability of a plea
agreement. 280 These defenses include invalidation arguments such
as failure to bargain in good faith, duress, unconscionability, and
the creation of an illusory promise.281 Finally, this section proposes
an alternative resolution to the current circuit split that may ap
pease the courts on both sides and benefit both prosecutors and
defendants. 282
A.

Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Agreements

Prosecutorial discretion and plea agreements play an integral
part in the administration of justice.283 Wade v. United States 284 rec
ognized this importance and refused to allow judicial intervention
into prosecutorial discretion, absent specific unconstitutional mo
tives. 285 The non-reviewing courts have embraced this reasoning
and held that Wade applies even when the prosecutor and defend
ant have formed a plea agreement.
1.

The Applicability of Wade to Written Plea Agreements

As previously discussed, the Wade Court held that when a
prosecutor fails to file a substantial assistance motion, the prosecu
tor's discretion is reviewable only if motivated by unconstitutional
prejudices.286 For example, if the prosecutor decided not to file a
279. See infra Part lILA.
280. See infra Part III.B.
281. See infra Parts III.B.4.a-d.
282. See infra Part IILe.
283. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
284. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
285. See id. at 185-86.
286. See id. Wade pled guilty to a crime without the protection of a plea agree
ment, but nonetheless spontaneously offered the prosecutor information, presumably in
the hopes that his sentence would be reduced. See id. The prosecutor readily accepted
the information and used it to his benefit, but offered no substantial assistance motion.
See id.
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substantial assistance motion due to the defendant's race, sex, or
religious affiliation, a court could independently review the assist
ance provided by the defendant. 287 According to Wade, before a
court will allow discovery or an evidentiary hearing about a defend
ant's accusation of unconstitutional prosecutorial motivation, a de
fendant must make a "substantial threshold" showing that the
government's refusal to file the substantial assistance motion was
based on an unconstitutional motive or was "not rationally related
to any legitimate [government] end."288 In Wade, the defendant
never entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor, but rather
volunteered all information. 289 Therefore, in writing for a unani
mous Court, Justice Souter did not address the judicial reviewability
of a prosecutor's failure to file a substantial assistance motion in the
context of a written plea agreement. 290 If the facts had been differ
ent, however, the Court may have decided to extend its analysis and
examine the issue of prosecutorial discretion and sole discretion
substantial assistance motions.
The major argument against applying Wade in cases involving
sole discretion clauses is that Wade did not involve a written plea
agreement. 291 Courts that refuse to apply Wade 292 note that the de
fendant in Wade bargained away nothing,293 and therefore Wade is
distinguishable from those cases involving a written sole discretion
substantial assistance agreement. Thus, the reviewing courts argue
that since Wade is factually distinguishable from the written plea
agreement situation, the court is not limited by the restrictive lan
guage used in Wade, and is free to examine the agreement based on
'2J37. See id.
288. Id. at 186.
289. See id. at 183.
290. Therefore, the Supreme Court left the lower courts to ponder the Wade im
plications on their own. See Fisher, supra note 99, at 762 (stating that "Justice Souter's
failure to resolve the apparent ambiguities in § 5K1.1, his failure to address plea agree
ments, and his failure to reconcile the disagreement in the circuits demonstrate his un
willingness to make [Wade] significant"). Many courts have held that Wade is
distinguishable from sole discretion plea agreements and therefore not applicable. See
supra Part II.B for a thorough discussion of the circuits that allow courts to review a
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion.
291. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "[a]
close reading of Wade indicates that its teachings are confined to situations in which
there is no plea agreement").
292. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the reviewing circuits and their refusal
to apply Wade.
293. See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 483 ("[T]he difference between the situation now
before us and that in Wade is that the defendant here has bargained away important
rights.").
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contract theory.294
While it may appear obvious to the reviewing circuits that
Wade is distinguishable from cases involving sole discretion sub
stantial assistance plea agreements, a cost-benefit analysis demon
strates that both situations are quite similar. Therefore, it may not
be possible to completely discard Wade, as the reviewing courts at
tempt to do.
A cost-benefit analysis simply examines the effects of external
factors (cost) on future decision-making (benefit). The cost-benefit
analysis of Wade reveals the following costs and benefits. In Wade,
the risk of being imprisoned was very high. In an attempt to reduce
his sentence, the defendant offered (without a plea agreement) all
the crime-related information he possessed.295 Despite the fact
that the government found the information very helpful, the gov
ernment never agreed to file a substantial assistance motion. 296
This same cost-benefit equation fits the sole discretion substan
tial assistance situation as well. Regardless of the presence of a
written plea agreement, the risk of lengthy imprisonment is still
very high because the Guidelines require imposing a predetermined
sentence. In addition, while the defendant attempts to reduce the
high risk of imprisonment by revealing all criminal information, the
sole discretion agreement guarantees nothing in return since the de
cision to award the substantial assistance motion rests entirely with
the prosecutor.297
Hence, both situations end with a high risk of imprisonment
and a low guarantee of a reduced sentence, no matter how "sub
stantially" the defendant assists the government. In either the
Wade or the sole discretion plea agreement situation, the govern
ment has the right not to file a downward departure motion. More
over, in either circumstance, the government is under no obligation
to use objective factors in its decision of whether or not to file the
motion. Consequently, the court cannot easily review the prosecu
tor's decision.
Therefore, despite the factual distinction between the two situ
ations, the cost-benefit analysis reveals that the difference may be
insignificant. If the difference is in fact insignificant, it would ap
pear that Wade must also apply to the sole discretion substantial
294. See id. at 481 n.l.
295. See generally Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
296. See id. at 183.
297. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
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assistance cases. Thus, a prosecutor's decision in a sole discretion
substantial assistance case should be reviewable only upon uncon
stitutional grounds.
Although this is a logical reason for applying Wade to sole dis
cretion substantial assistance cases, other considerations should also
be taken into account. To ensure fairness and justice, courts may
have a stronger interest in reviewing cases in which the defendant
actually contracted for a specified term. Wade offered information
uncoerced and without any exchange. 298 Conversely, defendants
who do not volunteer information freely, but rather bargain away
the information for an increased chance of freedom, should be al
lowed to attack the agreement and require specific performance in
the form of a 5K1.1 motion. 299 Although it is not possible to re
quire specific performance of a clause that is not obligatory, it is
possible to require the parties to act in good faith, and any actions
to the contrary would permit the court to force the prosecutor to
file the motion. Both defendants in the cost-benefit analyses gave
valuable consideration in the form of a bargain in exchange for a
potentially shorter sentence. While the cost-benefit analysis of sub
stantial assistance plea agreements may be essentially identical to
Wade, in order to uphold the integrity of the justice system, courts
should discard Wade in sole discretion substantial assistance cases
and allow good faith and other contract principles to become part
of the enforceability determination. 3 °O
Allowing a court to review the prosecutor's decision not to file
a substantial assistance motion would be a further check on
prosecutorial discretion. After all, the sentencing judge is the one
who determines the defendant's exact sentence. 301 This examina
tion would also further ensure the integrity of the judicial system by
allowing an objective outside party to view the various factors the
prosecutor considered when making the decision whether or not to
file a 5K1.1 motion.
298. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 183.
299. See generally Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481; see also United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d
331,334-35 (2d Cir. 1996). In Pollack, the court stated that "where the explicit terms of
a cooperation agreement leave the acceptance of the defendant's performance to the
judgment of the prosecutor, the prosecutor may reject the defendant's performance
provided he or she is honestly dissatisfied." Id. at 335 (quoting United States v. Rex
ach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1990)). "The government's dissatisfaction, however,
cannot be premised on bad faith, invidiousness, or dishonesty." Id.
300. See infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the policy issues behind
allowing the application of contract principles to substantial assistance motions.
301. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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The non-reviewing circuits hold that "sole discretion" bestows
an absolute power upon the prosecutor: the sole discretion agree
ment "plainly reserves the government's [own] discretion to receive
information from the defendant and then exercise its discretion on
whether to file for a downward departure."302 Consequently, these
circuits seem to imply that the simple presence of "sole discretion"
language forecloses any possibility that the agreement is a contract,
and thus reviewable. 303 This implication ignores the fact that plea
agreements, notwithstanding the "sole discretion" language, con
tain all the basic elements of a contract.
A contract is "[a]n agreement between two or more persons
which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. "304
At common law, contract formation merely required (a) offer and
acceptance and (b) consideration. 30s Plea agreements satisfy both
elements, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement arises in the
criminal context. Regardless of the circumstances in which a con
tract arises, its existence remains undisputed provided that all of the
essential elements are present. The defendant has an obligation to
provide substantial information and the government has an obliga
tion to fairly evaluate the information in determining whether the
information is "substantial." A plea agreement contains a bar
gained-for exchange, consideration, and mutual assent, which
culminates in a formal, written, and signed document which con
tains all the essential elements of a contract.
A legal agreement, whether it be a civil or a criminal plea
agreement, must be reviewable under basic contract principles. 306 It
appears that the only reason the non-reviewing courts refuse to ap
ply contract law to the plea agreement is the presence of sole dis
302. United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, No. 97-3138, 1998 WL 544310, at *4 (10th
Cir. Aug. 26, 1998) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938
39 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1996).
304. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) ("A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty.").
305. See Richard L. Savage, Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in Section 2-313
of the Uniform Commercial Code: An "Endpoints" Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1065, 1084 (1993) (citing EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 252-53 (4th ed. 1991)).
306. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998). In Isaac, the
court stated that" 'although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains
contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law principles.''' Id. (quot
ing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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cretion language. However, the sole discretion language is not
separate from the agreement itself, but rather it is just another com
ponent of the contract. Indeed, the "sole discretion" language is
only one of many clauses that make up the entire plea agreement
contract. 307 It is illogical that the presence of the words "sole dis
cretion" would automatically invalidate the classification of a plea
agreement as a contract. Any other classification contradicts basic
legal principles.
Although the non-reviewing circuits do not apply contract
principles when examining a prosecutor's decision not to file a sole
discretion downward departure motion,308 one of the non-reviewing
circuits may be reconsidering its position. 309 In contrast to those
courts that have explicitly refused to apply contract principles to
"sole discretion" plea agreements based on Wade v. United
States ,310 the Seventh Circuit gave serious consideration to review
ing the agreements. For example, in United States v. Burrell,311
although the court ultimately held that sole discretion plea agree
ments are not worthy of contract theory invalidation, the court
closely examined the contract arguments. 312 The court considered
that "[a] guilty plea induced by an unkept bargain is involuntary
[and therefore] the court must allow the defendant to withdraw the
plea and to start all over."313 Thus, the Seventh Circuit may be
willing to reconsider the issue and allow rescission of a plea agree
ment if the right facts present themselves, such as in a case in which
the prosecutor's decision resulted in blatant injustice. Should the
Seventh Circuit ever decide to review plea agreements, the basis of
such a decision would probably rest on the potential coercion of the
agreement, as opposed to contract formation. 314
United States v. Fairchild,315 presented another example of the
Seventh Circuit's hesitation to deny reviewability of plea agree
ments. The court expressed concern over the prosecutor's absolute
307. See Hughes, supra note 36, at 2-3 & n.4; see also United States v. Price, 95
F.3d 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (demonstrating a sole discretion clause); Adamson v.
Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 1986) (demonstrating a multi-clause plea agree
ment), rev'd, 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
308. See supra Part II.A for a more detailed examination of the circuits that do
not review prosecutorial discretion.
309. See generally United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991).
310. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
311. 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1992).
312. See id. at 985.
313. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1992».
314. See id.
315. 940 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1991).
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discretion. 316 The court stated that "[n]othing in the plea agree
ment ... gives away the government's discretion" to decide whether
or not to make the motion, thus, there is no reason to review the
government's decision not to file a downward departure motion. 317
However, the court stated that the government should clearly de
fine "substantial assistance" in objective terms. 318 The court stated
that "the government [should not] take advantage of a defendant's
ignorance of the [caselaw on] substantial assistance so as to mislead
him into believing" that the government will file a downward de
parture motion if the defendant acts in good faith.319 Although the
Seventh Circuit ultimately refused to classify the agreement as a
contract, it appears that the court may be heading in that
direction. 320
More objectivity in the plea bargain agreement would serve a
dual purpose. It would be useful (1) for the defendant to know
exactly what is expected of him prior to signing the agreement; and
(2) as a method for courts to ensure that the agreement is fulfilled.
For instance, if the agreement defined substantial assistance as "in
formation that directly leads to the prosecution of another," and
the defendant did in fact procure such information, the court could
easily question the government's motives if the government failed
to file a 5K1.1 motion. The drawback to this "objective definition"
solution is that the defendant's incentive to reveal information be
yond what is required by the agreement disappears. This approach
would also put tremendous pressure on the prosecutor to gauge
how much information the defendant actually knows at the outset
of plea negotiations-a nearly impossible task.
2.

Judicial Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutors and defendants rarely appeal sentence departures
316. See id. at 266.
317. Id.
318. See id. An objective substantial assistance agreement might, for example,
include a definition of substantial assistance. This definition would vary from defendant
to defendant because each case would be unique. Such a definition might read as fol
lows: "Substantial assistance, for purposes of this agreement, requires that you, the de
fendant, will provide information that directly leads to the prosecution of one of your
suppliers. We, the government, must receive this substantial assistance prior to filing a
§ 5K1.1 motion." While this solution would not forbid a sole discretion clause, it would
make the test more objective and promote fairness. The defendant would at least
know, prior to the signing of the agreement, that he must assist in some specified man
ner before the government will consider filing a downward departure motion.
319. See id.
320. See id.
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for two reasons. First, the government must file a motion prior to
the court granting a substantial assistance departure. 321 This re
quirement implies that the government has agreed to a sentence
departure, and therefore, the government is unlikely to appeal.
Second, defendants are unlikely to appeal because downward de
partures are generally to their benefit. 322 Even when a party does
appeal, appellate courts routinely refuse to hear objections because
upon receipt of the government's substantial assistance motion, the
court has unfettered discretion whether to grant or deny the mo
tion. 323 Due to the court's unwillingness to review sentencing de
partures, "prosecutors 'are free to be lenient or harsh ... without
public[ ] explan[ation]''' or defense of their decisions. 324 This result
has led many to believe that courts have unknowingly undermined
the underlying goals of uniformity and fairness of the Guidelines
because prosecutors are allowed to act with virtually no judicial
intervention. 325
There is little opportunity to check the constitutionality of
prosecutorial decisions because of the "private nature" of
prosecutorial decision making.326 When the prosecutor makes a de
cision, there is no public proceeding where the prosecution must
present its legal theories in support of its decisions. 327 Whatever
321. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (stating that
"[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance" the court may depart from the guidelines) (emphasis added).
322. See Lee, infra note 327, at 206.
323. See United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir. 1990); see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (stating that upon meeting the
filing requirements of 5K1.1, "the court may depart from the guidelines") (emphasis
added).
324. Gyurci, supra note 13, at 1272-73 (quoting Testimony of the President of the
Federal Judges Association, Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., 6 FED. SENT. REP. 72, 72
(1993)).
325. See id.
326. See Lee, supra note 4, at 168. Prosecutors are under no obligation to docu
ment any analysis done in the contemplation and resolution of an issue. See id. at 168
69. Therefore, all cognitive decisions risk being interwoven with bias, prejudice, and
bad faith since no mechanism exists to observe a prosecutor's decision-making thought
process, although, courts will review prosecutorial decisions if there is evidence that
such a decision was based on an impermissible ground, such as race or religion. See id.
at 169 n.272.
327. See Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Fed
eral Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS
L. REv. 199,237-39 (1997) (stating that there is little opportunity to check prosecutorial
decisions, unlike in the judicial arena, where every decision is carefully recorded and
subject to intense review).
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the decision may be, it is almost always unreviewable. 328
In contrast to prosecutorial decisions, judges must state their
reasons for imposing a particular sentence in open court. 329 More
over, any decision by the judge to depart from the Guideline's
range is subject to appellate review. 330 All judicial decisions "must
be grounded on articulated facts and legal theories stated on the
open record."331 This system ensures a fair and just decision by the
judiciary. The judiciary could require prosecutors to be bound by
the same candor and documentation system in order to review
prosecutorial discretion in the context of substantial assistance or
sole discretion plea agreements.
If a court concludes that plea agreements are contracts, it could
also easily apply basic contract principles332 to ensure fairness and
justice. This would let defendants know prior to entering into the
agreement that although the government expects them to provide
substantial assistance, the government must measure their satisfac
tion in good faith.333 Further, defendants would know that a claim
that the government acted in bad faith, supported by some defined
minimal evidence, would give them a chance to have the court ex
amine the prosecutor's discretion. 334

B. Sole Discretion Plea Agreements and Contract Principles
Santobello v. New York 335 stands for the proposition that when
a prosecutor specifically agrees to act pursuant to a signed plea
agreement, the prosecutor is bound to that agreement. 336 If con
tract principles are applied to plea agreements, the application may
indeed have the effect of limiting prosecutorial discretion and in
creasing court intervention. Regardless of potential drawbacks, jus
tice and fairness would be better served if courts were to view sole
discretion plea agreements as contracts.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 238.
330. Id.
331. See id. (citing United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash.
1990), vacated in part, affd in part, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991».
332. See generally supra Part II.B for a discussion of the courts that have applied
contract principles to plea agreements.
333. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998).
334. See id. at 482-83.
335. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
336. See id. at 262.
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1. Should Courts Apply Santo bello and Contract Principles?
"Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains . . . ."337
Therefore it seems only natural that courts should regulate and
evaluate plea agreements as any other bargaining agreement. 338
A typical criminal plea bargain may take place in a courthouse
hallway between the attorney for the defendant and the prosecutor,
lasting only minutes. 339 The simplicity of the transaction may be
surprising to outside observers since the outcome of this quick "bar
gain" will affect years of a defendant's life. 340 While apparently a
simple transaction, this type of bargain involves several complex
contractual elements. 341 In addition, these "bargains" serve a great
purpose in the judicial system: they promote judicial efficiency by
eliminating the need for a criminal trial.3 42
In contrast to the simple hallway plea, complex plea agree
ments are common when defendants are facing serious or multiple
criminal accusations. These more complex bargains may involve
cooperation agreements and multiple contested issues that involve
months of negotiation before the parties reach a resolution. 343
These complex plea negotiations culminate in extremely complex
and long written agreements. 344
The reviewing circuits correctly apply contract principles when
examining a prosecutor's decision not to file a sole discretion down
337. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1910 (emphasis in original).
338. See id.
339. See id. at 1911-12. The authors state that:
[M]ost cases are disposed of by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick
conversation in a prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attor
neys familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, lead
ing to a proposed resolution that is then "sold" to both the defendant and the
judge. To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail
and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.

Id.
340. See United States v. Atkinson, 15 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing an
example of a bargain in which the defendant's sentence was reduced from 405 months
to 300).
341. See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text for a discussion of the con
tractual elements present in a plea bargain.
342. See Saris, supra note 178, at 1052 (stating that nearly ninety percent of all
cases are resolved through a plea agreement rather than a jury conviction).
343. See Hughes, supra note 36, at 2-3.
344. See id. at 2-3 & n.4; see also Adamson v. Richetts, 789 F.2d 722, 737 (9th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (stating that the defendant's signature was on page five of the plea
agreement), rev'd 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
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ward departure motion. 345 Generally, the reviewing circuits have
stated that although Wade v. United States 346 "outlined a narrow
space for a defendant to challenge the government's refusal to file a
5Kl.l motion in the absence of a plea agreement," i.e., refusal to
file the motion based on unconstitutional motivations, it did not in
struct the courts on how to deal with written plea agreements. 347
Rather than applying Wade to the issue of judicial reviewabil
ity of prosecutorial discretion, the reviewing circuits generally apply
Santo bello v. New York,348 which applied contract principles to plea
agreements. 349 "[O]nce the government makes an agreement with
a defendant to file a [section 5Kl.l] motion, it is bound by the
terms of the agreement. It is a simple matter of contract law."35o
Applying contract principles to a prosecutor's refusal to file a sub
stantial assistance motion under 5Kl.l requires the existence of a
contractual relationship between the defendant and the govern
ment. Because Wade is inapplicable, the court may examine the
prosecutor's discretion for reasons beyond those of unconstitutional
motives. 351 The reviewing circuits correctly recognize that sole dis
cretion plea agreements contain all the essential elements of a con
tract, and therefore basic contract principles must apply.352
Applying contract principles to plea agreements would also
promote judicial economy. It is more useful to have a uniform
"bright-line" rule that classifies all plea agreements as contracts, as
opposed to having all the circuits examining each individual plea
agreement to determine whether it possesses all the necessary con
tractual elements. Thus, "'where the agreement is conditioned on
satisfaction of the obligor, the condition is not met "if the obligor is
honestly, even though unreasonably, dissatisfied.'" "353 According
345. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the circuit cases that hold that courts
may review prosecutorial discretion.
346. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
347. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
Wade's holding is limited to situations where no plea agreement was ever made).
348. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
349. See id. at 262-63 (stating that plea agreements are specifically enforceable (a
contract remedy) against the government if the government breached the agreement).
See supra Part I.B.4.a for a discussion of Santobello.
350. United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1995).
351. See generally United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stat
ing that any review of a plea agreement includes an investigation into "good faith").
352. See id. at 691 ("[A] plea agreement is a contract."); see also Isaac, 141 F.3d
at 481-84 (reviewing the plea agreement between the defendant and the government).
353. Isaac, 141 F.3d at 482 (quoting United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979))).
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to the court, there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract. 354
Moreover, the usefulness of presuming a plea agreement to be
a contract is beneficial, not only to the court itself, but also to the
defendant. If the defendant is made aware of the contractual status
prior to the signing of the plea agreement, the defendant will be
able to make a more informed choice in deciding whether to plead
guilty and give up his or her constitutional rights associated with a
trial. Applying contract principles to plea agreements allows pre
dictability, consistency, and fairness. 355 By concluding that plea
agreements are contracts, courts afford the defendant the protec
tions associated with the judicial determination of the enforceability
of the contract.
2.

Enforceability of the Plea Agreement

"The bargain theory of contract has dominated American juris
prudence for well over a hundred years. Its remarkable durability
rests on a single idea: contracting parties can (and do) reach mutu
ally beneficial agreements that fully exploit the potential returns
from their joint enterprise."356 While bargain theory is a sound
concept, when courts apply bargain theory to sole discretion plea
agreements, trouble arises. 357
"[C]lassic contract theory supports a presumption favoring the
354. See id.
355. See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty
Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REv. 567, 583
(1999). The author stated:
Plea agreements are contracts of adhesion. Although courts analyze them ac
cording to ordinary contract principles, they supplement those principles 'with
a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant's right to fun
damental fairness under the Due Process Clause.' That means courts will hold
the government to a high level of responsibility in dealing fairly and honestly
with defendants during plea bargaining.
Id. (citation omitted).
356. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1935.
357. See Recent Case, Plea Agreements-Ninth Circuit Allows Post-Plea Agree
ment Collateral Attack Based on Change in Underlying Law-United States v. Sando
val-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REv. 603, 608 (1997). According
to the author:
The court's selective use of contract doctrine suggests that it did not fully stand
behind its assertion that plea agreements are contracts. Although the Sando
val-Lopez panel suggested otherwise, the Ninth Circuit has not fully applied
contract principles to plea agreements.... [A]lthough courts must use con
tract principles to review plea agreements based on breach claims, they cannot
consider some contract defenses, such as the mistake of fact doctrine.
Id.
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enforcement of plea bargains. "358 However, if courts examine sole
discretion plea agreements under contract theory, many of the
agreements would become invalid and result in excess litigation,
thus frustrating one purpose of the Guidelines: judicial economy.359
Specifically, defendants might consistently raise contract defense
arguments and force judicial intervention. Thus, instead of parties
arguing about the guilt or innocence of a defendant, or the impor
tant factors in the case, the court battIe would center on the en
forceability of the plea agreement under contract law.
Critics disagree as to whether courts should invalidate plea
agreements under the contract principles of lack of good faith, du
ress, illusory promise, and unconscionability.360 While it may seem
extraordinary "to look to contract theory to find reasons for prohib
iting contracts that allocate criminal punishment, ... contract law
routinely embraces arguments for limiting itself."361 In other
words, contract law embraces various methods by which it can po
lice itself. For example, if the defenses to enforceability fail, con
tract enforcement will prevail. Although the reviewing courts have
explicitly recognized only a duty to act in good faith, one could ar
gue that the doctrines of illusory promise, unconscionability, and
duress are also defenses that could force invalidation of sole discre
tion plea agreements.
a.

Duty to bargain and act in good faith

The common law of contracts requires that contracting parties
engage in certain activities and behave in a certain manner in order
to successfully create a legally binding agreement.
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injur
ing the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the con
tract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied
358. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1918.
359. See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of the need to economize judicial
resources.
360. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CAL. L. REv. 652 (1981) (arguing that all plea bargaining is inherently unfair); cf Ste
phen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1040-45
(1984) (stating that there will always be plea bargaining due to limited judicial resources
and a sense of "doing justice").
361. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1918 (arguing that contract law has several
theoretical tools to invalidate contracts, such as unconscionability, duress, vagueness,
lack of mutual assent, and lack of consideration. Therefore, contract law, when prop
erly applied, can police itself).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 362
The phrase "good faith" exists in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with each context. "Good faith perform
ance ... of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed [upon]
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party."363 In essence, good faith condemns types of con
duct characterized as "'bad faith' because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. "364 Although a
complete catalogue of what constitutes bad faith is not possible, the
following activities have been recognized as demonstrating bad
faith: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain ... willful rendering of
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and in
terference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's perform
ance."365 A prosecutor engaged in any of these activities clearly
frustrates the defendant's chance of receiving a just result.
For example, when party A to a contract gives party B discre
tion in the performance of some aspect of the contract, the parties
ordinarily assume that B will only exercise that discretion for a pur
pose reasonably contemplated by the parties. 366 If B exercises his
discretion for purposes not contemplated by the parties, B has per
formed in bad faith.367
In the case of a plea agreement, assuming that the agreement is
a contract, as long as there is some evidence to support the claim
that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, the defendant may ask the
court to review the agreement regardless of the fact that the prose
cutor reserved discretion to file the motion. 368 However, the de
fendant would still have to prove that the prosecution acted in bad
faith, notwithstanding any discretionary language contained in the
agreement. 369 The defendant must show that his performance sub
362. Uproar Co. v. National Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936).
363. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (discussing
the definition of good faith as utilized in varying contexts). See supra note 265 for the
definition of good faith.
364. RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS) § 205 cmt. a (1979).
365. See id. § 205 cmt. d.
366. See Stephen J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 369 (1980).
367. See id.
368. See United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979)).
369. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 14, at 504 (stating that "[t]he dissatis
faction must be actual and not merely simulated. Under the good faith test, it is diffi
cult for the plaintiff to prevail").
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jectively satisfied the prosecutor, and the prosecutor has other mo
tives for testifying as to his dissatisfaction.370 Therefore, if the
defendant wanted to have the prosecutor's refusal to file the sub
stantial assistance motion reviewed for lack of good faith, the de
fendant would have to establish the prosecutor's "true state of mind
by evidence showing that [the prosecutor] made statements giving
other reasons for his rejection of the performance. "371
Although seemingly a burden on prosecutors and the integrity
of the judicial system in general, the drastic consequences of the
prosecutor's decision outweigh these potential burdens. If the re
sult of analyzing plea agreements under contract principles causes
prosecutors to be held liable for their administrative decisions, then
prosecutors will be forced to carefully analyze the benefit they actu
ally received from the defendant. This consequence can only bene
fit the legal system by balancing the relative positions of the parties.
According to some authorities, evidence of the unreasonable
ness of the prosecutor's expressed satisfaction is admissible to jus
tify an inference of bad faith.372 For example, if the court finds that
the prosecutor acted unreasonably due to the overall extent of the
defendant's assistance, the judge may infer the prosecutor acted in
bad faith and had unreasonable expectations.
In addition to bad faith, another defense to contract enforce
ment is duress: a claim that one party exerted intense pressure over
the other. This factor is a variable a court should examine when
determining overall enforceability of plea agreements.

b.

Duress

One of the potential arguments for prohibiting plea bargaining
is that duress 373 impermissibly infects such bargains. Under ordi
nary contract theory, a party will prevail on a duress defense if he
370. See id.
371. Id. (stating that although the courts prefer to examine satisfaction based on
reasonableness, "[i]f the agreement leaves no doubt that it is only honest satisfaction
that is meant and no more [for example, sole discretion], it will be so interpreted, and
the condition does not occur if the obligor is honestly, even though unreasonably, dis
satisfied") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1979}).
372. See ARlHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 645 (1965).
The plaintiff should prevail if he can prove that the promisor is dissatisfied with his
bargain rather than with the performance. See id.
373. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (6th ed. 199O) (defining duress as a de
fense which "[s]ubject[s] [a] person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and
coerces him to comply with demand[s] to which he would not yield if acting as [a] free
agent").
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can prove that he would not have entered into the contract but for
the other party's "improperly coercive behavior."374 Applying this
principle to plea bargaining situations, supporters argue that the
large difference in sentencing ranges between the Guidelines'
mandatory sentence and the post-downward departure sentence
"creates a coercive environment in which the criminal defendant
has no real alternative but to plead guilty" and hope for a substan
tial assistance motion. 375 Thus, critics of the system assert that
pleas produced under this type of pressure are never voluntary.376
Consequently, the duress inherent in the bargain should invalidate
the contract, or at least permit judicial review of the prosecutor's
expectations. Absent the threat of losing one's freedom for an ex
tended period, it is highly unlikely that anyone would enter into a
sole discretion plea agreement since it provides no degree of re
viewability. It is an illogical bargain that a defendant would not
seriously consider, but for his precarious situation.
When examining the individual situation, duress is blatantly
apparent. For example, if a defendant faces a congressionally pre
determined sentence in excess of 300 months, and the evidence
against the defendant is fairly strong, the only hope the defendant
may have of escaping a severe sentence is to attempt to plea bar
gain with the prosecutor. In such a situation, the defendant is at the
complete mercy of the prosecutor. Any proposed terms that the
prosecutor dislikes will force the defendant into court. In addition,
the prosecutor has the ultimate power to file the plea agreement
with the court, and in substantial assistance cases, the power to de
cide the adequacy of the defendant's performance. This positioning
allows the prosecutor to exercise the full strength of his discretion
ary power. Assuming the defendant wishes to avoid trial and signs
a plea agreement containing a sole discretion clause, the defendant
loses all of his constitutional rights associated with trial, in exchange
for no guarantee of a reduced sentence.
Consider the following example: assume X wants to purchase
Y's car, and Y makes the following proposal: "X, I will consider
selling you my car for the fair market value. First, give me the fair
market value of the automobile. Then explain to me in detail why
this is the right car for you. I will later contemplate if I truly feel
this is the right car for you based on your argument, and if, at my
374.
375.
376.

See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1919.
See id. at 1920.
See id.
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'sole discretion,' I make this determination in the affirmative, I will
turn the vehicle over to you. On the other hand, if I determine in
my 'sole discretion' that this vehicle is not the right vehicle for you,
I will keep the vehicle and fair market value you gave me." Clearly,
X should not accept Y's offer because this is not a fair exchange.
As with the case of a prosecutor's sole discretion plea agreement,
Y's sole discretion offers little hope of fairness to X.
In both the sole discretion plea bargain situation, and the car
sale example, there is no method to objectively evaluate either the
prosecutor's or Y's discretion. This leaves both the defendant and
X in a completely inferior position. Both the defendant and X have
provided valuable consideration, and yet their subsequent actions
do not guarantee any return for them. X would never accept such
an offer because the consideration paid is too high for the risk of no
return. In the substantial assistance plea agreement situation,
although the defendant gives up more valuable consideration than
X (constitutional rights), he must accept an equally high risk of no
return (the prosecutor's arbitrary sole discretion standard). Sadly,
the defendant takes the risk that X never would: he signs the plea
agreement.
One reason for the criminal defendant's illogical decision may
be duress. The defendant would argue that the government's dis
cretion is purely subjective, with no objective factors to assist in the
evaluation of the defendant's substantial assistance. Moreover, be
cause the sole discretion language shields the prosecutor, the prose
cutor can refuse to file the 5Kl.l motion for any arbitrary reason.
Thus, the defendant would argue that but for the possibility of a
severe criminal sentence, such a choice would not be voluntary.
c.

Unconscionability

In addition to the duress defense, the doctrine of unconsciona
bility377 provides an alternative argument for invalidation of plea
agreements. Typically, a plea bargain involves a simple promissory
exchange: the defendant exchanges his promise to plead guilty for
the prosecutor's promise to recommend a reduced sentence or file a
substantial assistance motion. 378 In a sole discretion substantial
assistance agreement, the defendant obtains the prosecutor's prom
377. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1524 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "unconscio
nability" as "[a] doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair or op
pressive contracts because of procedural abuses arising out of the contract formation, or
because of substantive abuses relating to terms of the contract").
378. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1921.
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ise to consider filing a downward departure motion upon receipt of
"substantial" assistance. In this situation, a defendant who agrees
to a sole discretion clause that is buried in a long and complex plea
agreement may attempt to raise the defense of unconscionability.379
The doctrine of unconscionability serves as a kind of "back
stop," or "a means of granting relief where defects in the bargaining
process ... do not rise to the level of actual fraud or duress."38o A
claim of procedural unconscionability is more similar to a claim of
fraudulent concealment. 381 "'Ordinarily, one who signs an agree
ment without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume
the risk that he entered into a one-sided bargain."'382 But when a
party possesses little bargaining power and no real choice but to
sign, "with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that
his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was
ever given to all the terms. "383
Defendants, as laypeople, may not understand basic contract
principles. Even if the defendant retains an attorney and reads the
terms of the plea agreement, he may not understand the implica
tions of signing the plea agreement. If the parties do not fully dis
cuss the agreement, and the defendant does not completely
understand an important clause (such as the sole discretion substan
tial assistance clause) prior to the signing of the agreement, the gov
ernment should bear the burden of proving that the defendant
understood the agreement. Without such proof, the government
should bear the risk of having the agreement nullified for proce
dural unconscionablity.384
Associated with the claim of procedural unconscionability is a
claim for substantive unconscionability.385 A substantive uncon
scionability claim is actionable if there are "substantive abuses re
lating to [the] terms of the contract, such as terms which violate
379. See id. at 1922.
380. Id. at 1921.
381. The basic test of unconscionability is whether, under circumstances existing
at the time of the contract and in light of general commercial standards, a clause is so
one sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise the one party. See Division of the Triple T
Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
382. PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACITONS 3-15 (1989)
(citation omitted).
383. Id.
384. See id. (stating that a "court may use the procedural unconscionability doc
trine to ... abrogate the agreement altogether").
385. See infra note 386 and accompanying text for a definition of substantive
unconscionability.
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reasonable expectations of [the] parties or which involve gross dis
parities ...."386 "'[A] contract is largely an allocation of risks be
tween the parties, and therefore . . . a contractual term is
substantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the bargain in an
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.' "387 When an
agreement requires that a defendant give valuable consideration at
the outset of the plea bargain, and the prosecutor has the option of
giving nothing in return, the prosecutor has unreasonably reallo
cated the risk of loss on the defendant. This unbalanced bargain
involves substantive abuses amounting to a gross disparity.388 This
same argument could also lead to the conclusion that the plea bar
gain is an illusory promise.389
386. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (6th ed. 1990).
387. ALCES, supra note 382, at 3-19 (quoting A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
388. The defendant may also argue that the theory of gross disparity requires
invalidation of the entire plea agreement. In cases involving sole discretion plea agree
. ments, the defendant forfeits all rights associated with a trial and in return receives a
mere gesture that the government will subjectively consider a sentence reduction. See
United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). Although freedom of contract
is extremely broad, it is far from absolute. See Smith v. Bush, 312 F.2d 131, 133-34 (5th
Cir. 1963) (stating that the government has the right to limit a person's ability to con
tract based on public policy, health, and safety reasons). While it is possible to waive
constitutional rights by contract, there are limits, such as people cannot enter enforcea
ble contracts to enslave themselves. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the
Law of Contract, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 775-77 (1983). In plea bargaining, the defendant
literally trades the "risk of 'enslavement' (prison) ... for a certainty of somewhat less
enslavement." Scott & Stuntz, supra note 44, at 1929 (emphasis in original). Although
applying contract theory to plea agreements may permit the defendant to have a pleth
ora of defensive enforcement tools to combat unfair prosecutorial discretion, the
Supreme Court's decision in Wade may severely limit the extent to which contract prin
ciples apply.
389. See Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial
Adherence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 751 (1985). The author stated:
[I]n a commercial contract setting, for example, a court will construe as illu
sory, and hold unenforceable, any promise to perform that is conditioned on
the promisor's discretion. Where, however, the illusory promise is made by
the government in the context of plea negotiations, the prosecutor has been
held to be bound to the subsequent agreement and to his promise.
Id. at 757.
Some civil cases disallowed "sole discretion" language due to its illusory essence.
See Davis v. General Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp. 445, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (stating that
a promise to compensate based solely on the promisor's discretion is illusory and can
not support a binding contract). Likewise, in some pre-guideline criminal cases, the
court has held that sole discretion language used by the prosecutor in a plea agreement
is illusory. See People v. Tobler, 397 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (stating
that the plea bargain was unenforceable because "[t]here are considerations paramount
to the power of individuals to contract. . .. [B]ecause of the significance of plea bar
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Illusory promise

A promise lacks consideration if the purported promisor
reserves the possibility of choosing alternative performances and at
least one of which does not constitute consideration. 390 For exam
ple, X offers to sell some commodity to Y at $10.00 per unit, with
the quantity entirely left to Y's discretion. If Y accepts X's offer,
the contract will be ruled unenforceable because Y did not provide
valid consideration. 391 Y could choose to purchase nothing.
The offer proposed by the prosecutor seems analogous to the
above illusory contract example. In sole discretion plea agree
ments, the prosecutor is merely agreeing to consider the filing of a
substantial assistance motion, whereas the defendant is actually giv
ing valuable information to the prosecutor. The information given
by the defendant is valid consideration because it is an inducement
to the prosecutor to enter into a contract. In contrast, the prosecu
tor is offering potential or future consideration (a reduced sentence
for the defendant). Therefore, prior to the prosecutor filing the
5K1.1 motion, the contract is illusory, and thus invalid.
To date, no defendant has raised the illusory promise concept
to invalidate a plea agreement that contains a substantial assistance
clause. However, in In re Adirondack Railway Corp. ,392 a bank
ruptcy court held that if a contract is based on a condition that may
gaining, it is important that the conduct of the Court and the District Attorney meet
standards of basic fairness"). Looking at the wide-spread use of sole discretion plea
agreements, it is obvious that this line of reasoning has not been accepted by the federal
courts. See supra Parts II.A-B for examples of courts that permit sole discretion
language.
390. An illusory contract exists when parties reach an agreement, but one or both
parties fail to put forth actual valid consideration. An illusory promise is defined as:
A promise or apparent promise is not consideration if by its terms the prom
isor or purported promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances un
less (a) each of the alternative performances would have been consideration if
it alone had been bargained for; or (b) one of the alternative performances
would have been consideration and there is or appears to the parties to be a
substantial possibility that before the promisor exercises his choice events may
eliminate the alternatives which would not have been consideration.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 (1979). These types of promises have
also "traditionally been considered insufficient to support promissory estoppel liability
because they are not true promises." Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promis
sory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 857 (1990) (emphasis
in original).
391. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1979).
392. 95 B.R. 867, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). In Adirondack, a railroad corporation
contracted with the state of New York to restore a rail line, but the corporation later
went bankrupt. See id. at 868. The debtor eventually sued the state for payment for the
work it had performed. See id. After reaching a tentative settlement, the court rejected
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or may not arise, then the agreement is "a promise in form, but not
in substance."393 The court stated that statements of intention
which make performance entirely optional do not rise to the level
of enforceability.394
Although the facts of the Adirondack contract case are obvi
ously distinguishable from sole discretion plea agreement cases, the
court's contract analysis is applicable. Using this analysis, it ap
pears that prosecutors who use sole discretion plea agreements are
attempting to get something for nothing. Unfortunately for the
prosecutor, contract law does not permit enforcement of such an
agreement.
Although contract principles give the defendant additional
protections and increase predictability and consistency throughout
the judicial system, applying contract principles could also poten
tially frustrate some of the purposes behind the Guidelines. One
purpose behind the creation of the Guidelines was to ensure consis
tent and fair sentences. 395 Applying contract principles to plea
agreements would seem to enhance fairness and consistency. How
ever, another purpose of the Guidelines was to improve judicial
economy and allow sentencing that is relatively efficient and fast. 396
If contract principles are applied to plea agreements, this purpose
might be frustrated.
3.

Potential Negative Implications of Applying Contract
Principles to Plea Agreements

Although plea agreements contain all the necessary elements
of a contract, applying contract principles to plea agreements and
permitting judicial review presents problems. One drawback to ap
plying contract principles to a plea agreement is the fact that chal
lenges to the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial
assistance motion will expend precious judicial time and resources.
Because the unsatisfied defendant will use the court to resolve his
dissatisfaction with the prosecutor's decision, the defendant will de
feat the central purpose of plea bargaining-conserving energy and
resources. If all criminal prosecutions proceeded to trial, the judi
its acceptance because payment by the state was subject to liens that could arise later.
See id. at 874. This condition made the contract illusory. See id.
393. Id.
394. See id.
395. See supra Part LB.1 for a discussion of the purposes behind the Sentencing
Guidelines.
396. See supra Part LB.l.
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cial system would be gridlocked beyond repair. 397 Allowing plea
agreement contract arguments to fill the courts' dockets may cause
the courts to be just as gridlocked as they would be if all defendants
went to trial.
Another drawback of permitting review of plea agreements
under contract principles is the effect that such review may have on
the integrity of the Guidelines. Because of the possibility of over
crowded court dockets, if courts evaluate plea agreements using
contract principles, Congress would probably need to modify the
Guidelines to disallow the use of sole discretion language in plea
agreements. Only the removal of this tool from the prosecutor's
arsenal would curb the potential major influx of additional litiga
tion. Meanwhile, the use of sole discretion language would become
a less powerful prosecutorial weapon. The threat of gridlock may
also curb prosecutorial aggressiveness. It is possible that fewer
criminals would be prosecuted for lack of resources. With fewer
resources available, a type of selective prosecution may take place,
in which only the most dangerous criminals are prosecuted. Even
when criminals are prosecuted, the prosecutor may be hesitant to
enter into a plea agreement because of judicial oversight and addi
tional litigation the agreement may cause.
Notwithstanding these possibilities, it would be improper for a
court to deny a defendant justice solely on this basis. Rather, con
tract theory applicability should be evaluated on the substantive el
ements of the agreement itself and not based on fear of increased or
prolonged litigation. Assuming increased litigation does occur, and
Congress decides not to disturb the sole discretion language in the
Guidelines, justice would require the government to allocate more
money to the judicial system to accommodate the influx.
To avoid both the possibility of increased litigation over plea
agreements and the necessity of eliminating the sole discretion lan
guage of the Guidelines, Congress could modify 5K1.1 as I have
proposed in the following section. Modification would allow an un
satisfied defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if the prosecutor re
fused to file a substantial assistance motion. This alternative to the
current section 5K1.1 would have three benefits: (1) it would allow
the prosecutor to continue to derive the benefits of the sole discre
397. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 59 (1994); see also
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that a "[d]isposition of
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but ... highly
desirable [because] [i]t leads to [a] prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal
cases").
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tion clause; (2) it would acknowledge that plea agreements are con
tracts; and (3) it would allow the defendant to retain his or her right
to a trial without judicial intervention in the agreement. 398
Although contract disputes can be very complex and time con
suming to resolve, especially when intertwined with a criminal pros
ecution, the eventual outcome and protection afforded to all sides
far exceeds the ensuing complexity of issues that the judiciary must
resolve.
C. A Possible Solution: The Best of Both Worlds?

Because the majority of circuits do not allow review of
prosecutorial discretion,399 it appears from the number of cases that
have recently arisen regarding this issue that many defendants are
unhappy with the sole discretion plea bargaining process. In a ma
jority of sole discretion substantial assistance cases, defendants as
sert that they have substantially assisted the prosecutor, yet go
unrewarded-namely, the prosecution does not file a section 5Kl.l
motion. To comply with a prosecutor's request for assistance, de
fendants have gone undercover, risked the health and safety of
themselves, turned in family and friends, given up personal prop
erty, and subjected themselves to constant fear of bodily harm, all
in the hopes of receiving a substantial assistance motion from the
prosecutor.400 Even when a prosecutor refuses to grant the sub
stantial assistance motion, the assistance the defendant has given
can still be used by the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute
others.
The unfairness in situations such as these seems obvious. How
ever, the non-reviewing circuits have stated that their hands are tied
by the express language of the plea agreement--the government
has the "sole discretion" to decide whether the defendant provided
substantial assistance. 401 While sympathetic to the defendant's
plight, the courts refuse to intervene.402 Still, the government is
398. See infra Part III.C for an examination of this alternative (or "back-door")
clause.
399. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the majority position.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that the defendant and his brother testified against a drug dealer); United States v.
Kahn, 920 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant became an inform
ant for the government).
401. See Padilla v. United States, No. 95-1282, 1995 WL 590451, at *1 (8th Cir.
Apr. 3, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (stating that the plaintiff had no right to a substan
tial assistance motion).
402. See United States v. Carter, 122 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that
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free to use the defendant's information for whatever purpose it sees
fit, regardless of whether the defendant gains any benefit. 403 Not
only has the government received valuable information, but it has
also gained a conviction without a trial. In comparison, defendants
lose their constitutional rights associated with prosecution and trial.
Moreover, they have exposed themselves and their families to con
stant fear of revenge for the information revealed. Finally, the fate
of the defendants' sentences is determined by the subjective will
of the government, and if no substantial assistance motion is filed,
the rigid Guidelines. Taking into account the need for some prose
cutorial discretion and the importance of the defendants' constitu
tional rights, the following compromise would provide additional
fairness to defendants and reign in prosecutors' broad and unfair
discretion.
All plea agreements that include a sole discretion clause should
also be equipped with a "back door" escape for the defendant. The
back door clause would provide the defendant with some decision
making power by informing him or her of the prosecutor's decision
concerning the substantial assistance motion and allowing him or
her to make the next move. Thus, if the prosecutor decides that the
defendant's information does not satisfy the government's substan
tial assistance definition, the defendant may then withdraw his or
her guilty plea and stand trial. The back door clause should also
contain a provision that prohibits the use of information obtained in
the plea bargaining process against the defendant.
The following is an example of a possible "back door" clause:
Option of Retention of Rights by Defendant in a Sole Discretion
Plea Agreement404
A) After reasonable interrogation(s) and giving the defend
ant an opportunity to reveal all relevant information, and upon
the defendant's guarantee that he/she has no further relevant in
formation, the Government will assess the information received
based upon the following factors: importance, relevance, content,
truthfulness, danger to the defendant, depth, and coverage.
Upon completion of an assessment of the factors in the preceding
"[t]his is a difficult case because ... [of] the sympathetic considerations that [the de
fendant] presents. But, ... they do not require of the district court a different exercise
of discretion").
403. See id. at 476 (stating that it is "troubling" that the defendant provided infor
mation that convicted two drug dealers but received no benefit because of his
assistance).
404. Only to be used in conjunction with the offering of a "sole discretion" sec
tion 5K1.1 motion.
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sentence, the Government will make a judgement in its sole dis
cretion to either file the section 5K1.1 substantial assistance mo
tion or not. If the Government is honestly satisfied with the
information given by the defendant, the Government will file the
section 5K1.1 motion requesting a downward departure and in
form the defendant of its decision to do so. Upon the Govern
ment's decision to file the section 5K1.1 motion, and notifying
the defendant as such, the "back door" option terminates.
B) After a review of the factors outlined in Paragraph (A), if
the Government decides that the defendant did not provide sub
stantial information, and therefore it has decided not to file a
section 5K1.1 motion, the Government shall notify the defend
ant. The defendant shall have five (5) days to decide to either 1)
proceed with sentencing, knowing beforehand that the govern
ment will not be filing a section 5K1.1 motion; 2) attempt to re
veal further information; or 3) decide to execute the option to
withdraw his/her plea of guilty, and cause the case to proceed to
trial with a plea of not gUilty. None of the information that the
defendant revealed during the plea agreement negotiations may
be used against the defendant at trial, but the Government shall
have the right to retain all information and use it as is seen fit so
long as that use does not violate the above mentioned exception.
C) The defendant may only execute the Option of Retention
of Rights after the Government has denied the filing of a section
5K1.1 motion. Once the defendant has executed the Option of
Retention of Rights, no further plea agreement may be negoti
ated with the Government in the future concerning the same
charges.
This type of clause benefits both the government and defend
ants. Defendants retain the option to pursue their constitutionally
protected rights by going to trial. Moreover, even though they have
given up potentially important information (which cannot be used
against them), they have removed some of the discretion bestowed
upon the prosecutor. The prosecutor benefits by gaining poten
tially important information that may be useful in prosecuting
others, but is forced to offer the 5Kl.l motion for the assistance
provided or risk going to trial. Thus, inserting this additional clause
in plea agreements would allow the prosecutor to maintain sole dis
cretion, the initial choice to file the section 5Kl.l motion, and the
right to use the information from the defendant regardless of the
defendant's actual conviction. In return, defendants retain their
constitutional rights associated with trial, but are still forced to re
veal the maximum amount of information they possess if they want
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to retain the possibility of obtaining a sentencing reduction through
a 5K1.1 motion.
CONCLUSION

Courts are put in a difficult situation when confronted with a
defendant who claims to have substantially assisted the prosecutor
pursuant to a plea agreement, yet is not the recipient of a down
ward departure motion. Most courts defer to the sole discretion
language contained in the plea agreement and hold that the defend
ant is without remedy despite possible blatant unfairness to the de
fendant. Some courts, prompted by this unjust outcome, have
examined the plea agreements and held that regardless of their
criminal nature, they are in fact contracts to which contract princi
ples apply when analyzing their enforceability. This acknowledg
ment has led some courts to review the prosecutor's decision not to
file the substantial assistance motion using the basic contract princi
ples of good faith.
Despite the acknowledgement of contract formation by some
courts, a circuit split exists. The non-reviewing circuits have applied
Wade v. United States ,405 and permit review of prosecutorial discre
tion only if the motivation behind the prosecutor's decision was un
constitutiona1. 406 Conversely, the reviewing circuits have held that
Wade is factually distinguishable and does not limit a court's right
to use basic contract principles to review a prosecutor's decision not
to file a substantial assistance motion. 407
Substantial assistance plea agreements are contracts and courts
should examine their enforceability based on contract theory re
strictions. Plea agreement formation and contract formation are
identical, therefore justice requires that a defendant who is a party
to a plea agreement be given the same protections as if he or she
was a party to a contract. Although there are drawbacks to viewing
a plea agreement as a contract, fairness to the defendant outweighs
the potential risks to the efficiency of the justice system.
The issue at hand will not be resolved until the United States
Supreme Court decides a sole discretion substantial assistance case,
although a statutory modification could ultimately resolve the cir
405. 504 u.s. 181 (1992).
406. See id. at 185-86; see also supra Part II.A for a discussion of the courts that
do not review prosecutorial decisions for anything but unconstitutional motivations.
407. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the courts that do allow review of
prosecutorial decisions based on contract rights.
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cuit split without becoming submerged in the underlying theoretical
contract arguments. The solution is a compromise that ultimately
would allow both parties to walk away from a plea agreement with
some benefit, even if the agreement as a whole does not work out.
While prosecutorial discretion is vital to the functioning of the judi
cial system, at times its review is necessary in order ensure justice.
Justin H. Dion

